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ABSTRACT 
The projects presented in this thesis, which include performance, photography, and sculpture, investigate perception and cognition through 
the study and reconfiguration of content drawn from philosophy, cognitive science, and linguistics. I suspect that the language that we use to 
communicate about perception may be faulty.  Within this critical perspective, the projects are propositions in response to the question: What 
is the form of perception/cognition? Underlying the projects is a fundamental philosophical question: Why do we have conscious experi-
ence? In philosophy these are referred to, respectively, as the hard and easy problems of consciousness. I investigate the linguistic structures of 
‘langue’ and ‘parole’ in a related attempt to understand the function of language, first independently, and then within a cognitive framework. 
The experiments begin with words such as ‘definition’, ‘vision’, ‘perception’ and represent systems defined by these signifiers using objects, 
actions, and images. Reconfiguring the words into tangible experiments allows the nature of the phenomenon to be examined outside of 
the limitations of linguistic description. Ideally, the incongruity that might exist between the words and the experiences of perception and 
cognition can be uncovered through this process. 
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There is no obvious narrative, yet there is a story that might 
emerge from this network of interrelated topics and ideas. My 
hope is that as the thesis progresses and I show how the con-
cepts regarding perception have been used in projects, some of 
the abstract notions at the beginning will make more sense and 
the following projects will become conceptually grounded. 
These concepts, although they are not clearly part of the work, 
nevertheless provide the framework on which the projects are 
based. My aim is to strike a balance between explanation of 
these concepts and project descriptions.
The question of establishing a clear method and purpose for 
this thesis is itself problematic. I do not wish to limit the inter-
pretive possibilities of the work, by “explaining what it is.” Be-
cause the process is very conscious and specific, it is easy for the 
explanation of the process to be misconstrued as an absolute 
explanation of the work, or a dictation of how a project should 
be perceived. This could not be further from my intention. I 
do not believe that there is any “correct” interpretation of the 
work or that if the research that informed it is not understood 
that the work looses its meaning. Rather, I see the generative 
potential in both the presence and absence of this background, 
and believe it is the choice of each viewer to either engage with 
this material or ignore it.
I am influenced by the argument, first made to me by my pro-
fessor Walid Raad, that the language used to frame the “work” 
can never be distinguished from the work itself. In a moment 
when all artwork is a part of system of artist talks, statements, 
and press materials are a requirement of the system, this con-
PREFACE
The structure of this thesis is experimental. By necessity, the 
text that I contribute is both a tool and a contextualization of 
the projects that I have made during my time at M.I.T.  The 
project descriptions are an alternative formulation of the work, 
a representation that serves to communicate what occurred 
during the projects. The images are similar tools. Each of them 
is related to a broader project that this thesis will attempt to 
define. I include both descriptions of projects and conversa-
tional texts about the research and ideas that relate to them.1 
These relationships are generative, informative, and contex-
tual. When and where the mode of the relationship changes is 
not necessarily fixed or easily related. One of the purposes of 
this text is to work on the articulation of those relationships. 
Although they can never be substitutes for the photographs, 
sculptures and performances, the descriptions might still have 
some potential to inform the reader about the basic conceptual 
structure of the work. Because this structure is the core of the 
projects, when it is understood some of the generative potential 
of the project, the ability to spark new ideas, initiate questions, 
and provoke thought, is itself if carried along in the text. In 
other words, the point of the project is grasped, even though 
the full experience is absent, and some of the salience of the 
thing is retained. 
1 These elements of the text are meant to function as both anecdotal 
introductions to the subject matter that I have researched, for the purpose 
of the projects, and to the process of making the work, based on these 
studies.
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visual elements of the work. Often it is easier to "understand" 
the work once we have read the label2. This “understanding” 
is the feeling of having assimilated the artwork into a body of 
knowledge that we already possess. For myself, this placement 
allows me to judge the work within a set of references that I 
have built throughout my education (both formal and infor-
mal) interacting with and reading about artwork, and historical 
and theoretical texts on artwork. Once we possess this infor-
mation it is impossible to see the work in the same way as we 
would without it. 
As I was talking about this issue recently with my advisor, Joan 
Jonas, she said that when she first encountered an Agnes Mar-
tin painting in the 50’s, she knew that there was something 
there, just by looking at the image. The label wasn’t important. 
Everything that needed to be understood was in the painting 
alone. 
The label only matters in so far as it calls on a set of knowledge 
that the viewer already carries with her. In Joan’s example, she 
2 If the artist hasn’t determined the content of the label, which is often 
the case, the understanding can be said to be inaccurate. Clearly the title 
and description are determined by the artist. While these elements might 
not deeply affect the reading of the work, the more “factual” elements 
of the label are certainly crucial to the work’s interpreted meaning. The 
artist is responsible for even the most basic artifacts; name and date. The 
artist collective the Bruce High Quality Foundation is an example of a 
group that has decided to alter their names and visual identities so that 
the content of the work might be perceived differently. They have estab-
lished their own story about the foundation, including a time line, that is 
not based on reality.
text is irreconcilably entangled in the experience of the work. 
In other words, the mode of presentation is not only dependent 
on the content and methodology of an artistic practice, but also 
inseparable from its reception. In my case the reception of the 
work is also the moment of its creation, because as an experi-
ment, others who experience the work serve as a catalyst of the 
project in its entirety. Without the audience, the work that I 
have either built or articulated is only a representation of its 
instantiated form. However I do not hold as radical a view as 
Raad, that written context (and all other contexts, in addition) 
is homogenous with all other elements in my artistic practice. I 
choose to make a distinction between the work 'proper' i.e. the 
performances, objects, etc. and the contextualizing material, 
i.e. the thesis, artist statement, artist talk. The process of mak-
ing these two types of product is totally different, and I treat 
them differently after the fact. As a viewer of others' work, I 
also make such a distinction. Because of these differences the 
distinction is a valid one, but it doesn't lead to the conclusion 
that either is less significant than the other in the process of the 
reception of the work. Although it is sometimes easy to think 
that the painting on the wall is much more important the label 
next to it, this is a purist's idealization of the process of viewing 
the painting. 
When I go to a museum I find it almost impossible not to read 
the label first. Why is this? The act of reading this sign affixed 
next to the work drastically alters the way that I perceive that 
painting, according to who the artist was and when the work 
was produced. A cascade of connotations and associations fol-
lows these labels and we use this information to interpret the 
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rence Weiner to follow the logic of his own conclusions5. Mark 
Ruwedel, a photographer whose work resonates with my in-
terests of photographing paths through the landscape, has only 
published writing that adheres to a very conservative form, 
which excludes the act of theorizing his own work6. Rather, 
when he writes, which is much less frequently than artists like 
Kosuth, he provides a sense of his influences, and comments 
on the concrete elements of the photographic process, such as 
where he traveled. The most theorizing he engages with is the 
act of positing the landscape as a historical archive, a concept 
which is presented primarily in its bare form:
“As a landscape photographer, I have come to think of the land as an 
enormous historical archive. I am interested in revealing the narratives 
contained within the landscape, especially those places where the land 
reveals itself as being both an agent of change and the field of human 
endeavor.”
This quote is the extent of the theoretical position that Ruwe-
del establishes. Am I more like Ruwedel or more like Kosuth? 
I have strong sense of a theory that informs my methodology, 
though it is not an academic theory or one that is directly a part 
of any movement shared by peers. It is something that I invent, 
and I can’t defend it on any objective basis. The articulation 
of this theory is not necessary to the work, and it can even be 
harmful. Overexplaining a work can give the impression that 
5 Martin Prinzhorn, Conversation with Joseph Kosuth (KünstlerInnenpor-
träts 37, Museum in Progress 1996)
6 Mark Ruwedel, “The Land as Historical Archive,” American Art 10, 
(Spring 1996): 36-41.
had the advantage of minimal knowledge3. I have become part 
of a community where it is extremely rare for people to en-
counter work with no knowledge of its context, and the abil-
ity to look purely at the images.  I am speaking mostly to the 
concerns of that community. Most of us begin looking at art 
with minimal context, despite the label on the wall, but this is 
a once in a lifetime event. After we establish this context, we 
can only exercise unmediated viewing by intentionally block-
ing out contextualizing material. Ultimately this type of un-
derstanding is no more “real” than the mediated understand-
ing that comes from an artwork surrounded by text. To make 
work that ignores the system in which it is implicated risks 
irrelevance and naiveté. 
 
My proposition is that the label besides a painting and a thesis 
are just different versions of the same kind of document. The 
upshot is that this document, whatever my other intentions, 
will mediate the work, and it's contents are shaped by that con-
cern.
Some artists, such as Joseph Kosuth, were explicitly interested 
in articulating philosophies of art production4. The process of 
conceptualizing, not only his own, but also art in general, was 
a crucial element of Kosuth’s practice. His normative form of 
conceptualization was so broad as to have inclined him to at-
tempt to persuade his peers, such as Robert Morris and Law-
3 Of Minimalism!
4 Joseph Kosuth, “Art After Philosophy,” in Joseph Kosuth, Gabriele 
Guercio ed., Art After Philosophy and After: Collected Writings 1966 - 1990 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 19.
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the viewer or critic to get caught up in a fruitless comparison 
between the language and the work. I will try to be careful 
here not to overstep and to leave the interpretation of the proj-
ects to those who bring more to the arena that I can do myself. 
I believe that the theory and criticism put forward by indepen-
dent practitioners has the advantage of independent judgement. 
I have extensive knowledge about the intent of the work that 
is superfluous to its purpose. I cannot judge my own work and 
I have no argument to make about the work. This does pose 
a real problem to the traditional structure and purpose of a 
thesis, a thesis by definition being a statement with a plausible 
antithesis. There is no antithesis here. Instead, this "thesis" is 
a compilation of statements and pseudo-conversations–sum-
maries of the discussions that have occurred in the fields that 
the artist might create for the purpose of making the work. It cannot be a 
definition of the work, which requires the real experience of another sub-
jectivity. The reception of the work can never be meaningfully explained, 
except as a representation of the experience by someone who has expe-
rienced it. The artist can no more generalize the first hand experience of 
the work, than can one viewer say what some other viewer experienced. 
The artist makes the work and decides how the work is mediated by the 
language used. What the artist says is a decision about how to mediate 
the work and is as free as the choice of content and materials that the 
artist uses in the piece itself. What reason could there be that the distance 
of one statement from a work is correct, and the distance in another set 
be incorrect? The perception that there is a correct distance is exclusively 
dependent on the false analogy between A) a signified thing and B) its 
signifier, and A) an artwork and B) artist’s statement, because the only 
objective measure of good or bad would be a comparison to other re-
lationships between definitions and phenomena. If the statement of the 
work isn’t a definition, then it makes no sense to say that the language is 
inaccurate. It is the artist’s discretion to decide the consequences of that 
perceived distance to the reception of the work.  
it is an illustration of the theory, thus that the work is in service 
of the theory, rather than the other way around.
 
I have found that an artist's statement which adheres mainly 
to a factual description of the work and a brief foray into the 
roots of the ideas that instigated the projects is a helpful tool in 
conveying a part of the content of the work, without closing 
down the routes of interpretation. This is what I will try to do 
in this thesis as well. Conversation between me and an audi-
ence can be another effective tool towards reaching a shared 
understanding of some of the content that I am interested in, 
and has been a significant element of the context of all of the 
projects presented here. By answering questions, a process that 
I find much more interesting and worthwhile than making a 
statement, generally, there can be a process through which I 
understand the processes that begins to happen when I show 
the work, and where my understanding of the genesis of the 
work can become useful to the viewer. Of course this is not 
always the case. A statement on the other hand can easily be 
too prescriptive, whether verbal or text, and this can render the 
experience of the project dull or conflicted over it's methodol-
ogy (conflicted over its content is not a bad thing). This con-
flict over methodology generally comes in the form, “the work 
is too distant from the language” or “what you’re saying isn’t 
reflected in the work”7 The overreaching language has caused 
7 These statement are always true. The presupposition of the criticism–
that the language and the work should ‘match’ is a mistaken projection 
by the critic that the artist either can or should define the work with their 
language. Even if the artist says “this is what the work does” or “this is 
what the work is” he or she is only talking about the process of making 
the work. How is this? The projection of a viewer is an armature that 
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something crucial. This section addresses the concern of how 
I regard the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, 
not only the possibility that my work is somehow objective. 
It simply cannot be, because it does not propose new factual 
knowledge.
Although my work is very much concerned with objectivity, 
though involvement with empirical and analytic methods, this 
objectivity in science, and perhaps philosophy, occurs in small 
and hard fought territories. Tiny islands in a sea of subjectivity. 
My concentration on these attempts at objective study must 
be prefaced on the knowledge that subjectivity is a default. 
Subjective experience is overwhelmingly the majority of the 
way that perception and cognition have ever been understood. 
Luckily, subjective understandings of experience and objective 
ones are not in competition with one another. They are merely 
different modes of understanding, and the assertions from the 
perspective of one do not exclude the perspectives of the other, 
although they may lead to different ways of thinking. Though 
there is an inherent problem in objective study of perception 
and cognition, namely that they cannot be directly observed, 
there are still ways in which science engages with the problem. 
Computational simulations attempt to reconstruct neural sys-
tems within a environment of code and hardware. Behavior and 
physical occurrences in the brain are correlated using FMRI, 
PET, and CAT scans. Philosophers, often working with the 
products of scientific study attempt to make carefully reasoned 
arguments that do not pull spurious information or make leaps 
that lead to false conclusions. This attempt at objective truth is 
never a guarantee, but the possibility exists that the informa-
have informed the projects. These are the main content of the 
discussions that I have had around the work, and they naturally 
fit into a dialectical format. Although I would prefer to present 
them in such a form, the written nature of the thesis makes it 
problematic to include something like interviews or the like. 
The project statements, in conjunction with the discussions, 
form a picture that shows a trajectory to the projects. This it-
self is the closest thing to an argument that I can present here. 
By showing how visual art projects can be used to approach 
a topic of this sort, there is an implicit case for the efficacy of 
these types of projects to do the things that I claim: explore the 
topics of perception and cognition, uncover the incongruity 
between the words and the experience. 
A NOTE ON OBJECTIVITY:
I try to maintain very conservative claims about the objectiv-
ity of the projects and the information that is put forth in this 
paper. Because of my methodology, which has systematic ele-
ments, and also makes reference to systems of analysis, science, 
and reason, perhaps in contrast to other artists, who happen to 
work in areas where there is no need to skip between subjec-
tive and objective materials, I have been asked several times 
whether I think my work is "objective" or if I believe that there 
is a true or absolute perceptual experience. To some it seems 
obvious that this is not the case, while others have questioned 
my intentions. It seems worthwhile to address these concerns, 
although the statement might be unnecessarily explicit. First, 
as someone who is not primarily in the field of generating fac-
tual knowledge, like a scientist, the form of the question misses 
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beginning it is possible to gather evidence, to analyze facts, and 
to piece together theories which generate hypotheses that stand 
up to scrutiny. This is the mark of an island of objectivity. It is 
formed by the application of objective techniques to subjective 
observations, and it is a long and indefinite process. The nature 
of this epistemological problem is one the bases of my intense 
interest in the problem and eagerness to better understand the 
forces at play within this aporia of knowledge. 
tion that is found will corroborate other pieces of information 
to eventually form a theory on which new, accurate hypotheses 
can be made. This is not true of subjective observations alone, 
and this is why objectivity continues to fascinate and beckon. 
I am agnostic towards an existence of an explanatory gap8, al-
though I do believe that the conclusion must cohere with our 
current understanding of physical science, which seems to take 
on certain challenges from dualist perspectives9, even though 
naturalistic dualism tries to resolve these problems without dis-
turbing our current physics. Other artists have had objectives 
in their investigations of perception and some have been in-
terested in putting forward a proposal on their specific beliefs 
towards the mind/body problem. Later on I will mention the 
position of Robert Morris, one of the most recognized. I be-
lieve in the possibility of a more developed conclusion on the 
mind body problem, but I find several contradictory arguments 
persuasive in different ways10. I do not believe that the premises 
of the current research of psychology and cognitive science are 
necessarily adequate to reach a conclusion about the relation-
ship between experience and the physical world. All premises 
are developed out of subjectivity and thus might be incorrect. 
Thought they risk this error, there is no alternative. From this 
8 The epistemilogical problem that has been posited as th inability to 
draw information about the nature of first hand experience from physical 
data about the brain. To be explained in more detail futher on. 
9 Dualist perspectives, including naturalistic dualism, point to the exis-
tence of conscious experience as something outside of the realm of physi-
cal sciences. This implies the need for the expansion of the domain of 
science, or the abandonment of the current system of thought.
10 David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, and Daniel Dennett are among 
those whose arguments I find persuasive.
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complex, reified mental structures, as well as behavioral study 
to posit theories about how the mind works on a human level. 
What is the form of this consciousness? What is the ontological 
explanation? These fields are in flux–authors arguing over the 
many methods of approach, because there is no unified sci-
ence of the mind and brain.11 There are many theories of how 
to categorize the contents of perception and thought. They 
tend to conflict with one another in unresolved debates. Many 
occur on disparate levels of discourse and without sufficient 
shared terminology, such that they cannot yet even engage in 
meaningful debate. For example, when a psychologist and a 
neurobiologist use the term “memory” there is only a small 
sliver of commonality in their meaning. 
Philosophers approach the question of consciousness through 
an analysis of language as well as known facts about minds 
in order to create reasoned arguments about the fundamental 
truths of consciousness and perception. Linguists try to un-
derstand the function of language systems. Understanding of 
these functions is deeply intertwined with the attempt to de-
construct neural processing. Mapping cognitive processes onto 
human experience, since so much of human experience is me-
diated by language, may depend on the development of our 
understanding of language. All of the fields mentioned here; 
philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive semanticists, linguistics, 
have distinct methodologies, but a common subject, shared by 
my course of inquiry.  
11    Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press 1989), 374.
INTRODUCTION
We have a field that pertains to vision and this field is an ele-
ment of the form of our perception. Where is (or how do we 
define) the field of touch, for example?  Or smell, propriocep-
tion, knowledge of relative location, or the very language that 
is used to name these concepts? Each of these senses has char-
acteristics of form, a field of awareness. Discovering the form 
of this field is a version of the "easy problem" which asks about 
the function of consciousness, rather than its cause. 
The disciplines that inform my study are neuroscience, linguis-
tics, and philosophy of mind. My aim is to integrate speech, 
text, and linguistic mental activity into representations of the 
perceptual/cognitive pathway. The question that interests me 
which is common to the science and philosophy of mind is: 
How does the physical world give rise to consciousness? Some-
times the physical world is as specific as the brain, and some-
times broader. This question has a relationship to many dispa-
rate fields. Neuroscientists ask how neurons function. Some 
neuroscientists and philosophers believe that if you understand 
how neurons function, then you will understand why and how 
these networks give rise to experience. Others believe that since 
all the information we have thus far about the neurology of the 
brain has not touched the question of why, that we must look 
for answers elsewhere. Cognitive semanticists believe that the 
answers to this question might be in the information systems 
that make up the mind rather than the physical structures that 
make up the brain. They look to language to understand what 
some of the underlying structures might be. Psychologists use 
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deeply collaborative faculty depending on memory, language, 
and transmuted information, that looses meaning when studied 
on a purely physical level. 
Two different questions are investigated within this thesis, one 
of which is directly probed by the projects described here, and 
the other which serves a background discussion for the projects 
and is something that I hope to investigate more directly in 
the future, if I can find an appropriate way to do it. The first 
is the question of the functional aspects of perception and cog-
nition. The second is the question of why we have conscious 
experience. I have realized through the process of writing this 
thesis that the two questions can be asked simultaneously in an 
artistic context. This was a very counter intuitive realization 
because David Chalmers, one of the prominent philosophers 
on the topic whose work has served as a guide for me, has made 
a great effort over the past twenty years to eliminate the con-
fession of these two separate problems within his field, and his 
is a primary source of my knowledge of the distinction. This 
separation is necessary for philosophical clarity on the matter 
because if one poses the hard question and then answers with 
a response suited to the easy question, which Chalmers con-
tends many have done15, then the result is useless. But because 
of the non-exegetic aim in the artistic context in that I work 
in, I believe that the questions of why and how these processes 
occur should be joined. The reason for this is that it is not the 
factual reality of the matter that is at issue, but the relation-
ship of the phenomenology of experience to the representa-
15 David Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 
Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3), (March, 1995): 200-219.
How are our words a map of the world? And where do the 
contours of experience and language diverge? There are many 
ways that the “kaleidoscopic flux”12 as Benjamin Whorf has 
called it, can be broken down into concepts and senses. For 
example, one culture may have 5 or 12 basic color names, 
whereas English has 1113. The flux of color experience has 
been broken down into different systems of color categories. 
Likewise, other terminology categorizes different phenomena 
and objects in particular ways. What forms these systems of 
categorization? Particularly the ones that refer to perceptual 
and cognitive systems? The current form of the language for 
these systems seems to be contingent on a colloquial system 
of understanding thought, perceptions, speech, memory, etc. 
However it is not clear what specific forces within experience 
gave rise to these divisions. In the color name example, the 
number seems to depend on the evolutionary sequence of the 
language.14 In the case of the lexicon of perception and cogni-
tion, it is still an unknown. Because of this gap in our knowl-
edge I am interested in challenging the formalized systems that 
have been used in the past, such as the systematic dissection of 
the senses into 5 discrete modes. It may be that this system is 
useful on the physical level of perception, but perception is a 
12 Benjamin Lee Whorf, J. Carroll ed. Language, Thought and Reality: 
Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (Cambridge: MIT Press 1st eds. 
1936,1940, 1941, 1942) 314.
13 Berlin and Kay define basic color terms as all color names that are 
monolexemic, high-frequency, and consensual within the language. 
The English terms that meet these criteria are: “black,” “white,” “red,” 
“green,” “yellow,” “blue,” “brown,” “orange,” “pink,” “purple” and 
“gray.”
14     Brent Berlin, Paul Kay, Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolu-
tion (University of California Press, Berkeley) 1969.
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ence. My project begins with an attempt to understand the 
mind/body problem by focusing on the current theories and 
roads of investigation, though the majority of that work is im-
plicit and not within the scope of this thesis. My hope is that it 
will become a the continuation of my work on perceptual and 
cognitive geometry. 
Perception is an action that is constrained by the physical struc-
tures of our bodies, like all elements of experience. Chalmers 
would say that experience supervenes on neural functions. We 
assume that experience is dependent on the kind of body that 
we have. This goes for fine grained distinctions as well as broad 
ones – human experiences are very different than animal ex-
periences, but even two human bodies are different enough 
that there are very prominent differences between the experi-
ences of two humans (interestingly, these experiences differ 
more prominently between individuals than between cultures. 
There is an implicit assumption that animals with smaller brains 
have a lesser forms of experience based on their physiologies. 
For example the vast majority of humans do not have moral 
qualms about killing things like bugs, and if they do even have 
those, they might not have qualms about killing a life form like 
a virus. These actions are consistent with the belief that those 
forms of life have a lesser experience than our own. If the ex-
periences of the insect or virus were as "strong" or "significant" 
as our own, we would need to consider ourselves to be living 
in a universe of overwhelming horror and suffering. We can't 
prove that this isn't the case, but nevertheless we live in accor-
dance with a presumption that human experience is different 
from these other forms of experience, and that overwhelming 
tions we have for those experiences. Why this phenomenology 
is what it is and how the phenomenology functions are both 
equally relevant to that relationship. The philosophical analysis 
of language and logic that is meant to uncover a factual truth 
about consciousness does not require this simultaneous address 
of why and how.  Unlike in philosophy, where it is necessary to 
separate these questions, I can address them simultaneously, in 
such a way that they inform one another, without making the 
error that the easy problem, 'what', can be used to answer the 
hard problem, 'why'.
The first project is largely about the geometry of perception, 
that is, the inherent forms in which we perceive the world, 
both concrete aspects of vision, such as the shape, clarity, and 
color of visual information, as well as the mental processes that 
precede thought. The aspects of mental processes that precede 
thought include things like the merging of concepts with sense 
data, the use of memory in recognition, the elimination of 
irrelevant sense data. The creation of abstract notions is an ex-
ample of a cognitive process that is difficult to disentangle from 
perception, and is of particular interest in The Zavkhan Abstract. 
These projects range from the straightforward, like the range 
of the visual field, to the very complex, the way that color 
names match up with color sensations in a population, and the 
way that we create sense of place from many small instances of 
perception. The second question, which I see as a future direc-
tion of my work, more than the current topic, is the relation-
ship between the physical world and experience. This question 
is alternately referred to as the hard problem, the mind/body 
problem, and the question of why we have conscious experi-
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memories, and feelings, but each of these things seems apt to 
differ between individuals in much the same way. It is im-
portant to clarify here that I still am speaking on the level of 
form rather that individual instance. I mean that the memories 
between people will have different forms, not merely that peo-
ple will have different memories (which is obviously the case) 
Unlike the external physical characteristics of our bodies, it is 
not obvious that there are differences in the perceptual or cog-
nitive apparatus between two average people (excluding cases 
of impairment and illness), like it is obvious that one persons 
arm's are longer than anothers’. This spectrum of differences 
between individuals is another question of interest, in addition 
to the question of the general form of human experience. 
RELATIONAL FORMS BETWEEN ART AND PERCEP-
TION
The latter projects in this thesis–the four projects found in the 
fourth section–each have a direct relationship to the problems 
of consciousness and perception that I bring up here. By recon-
structing a narrowed and simplified event of perception/cogni-
tion some of the elements of the perceptual process are put for-
ward within a model for examination. This is the relationship 
between the theory and the project. Elements of the perceptual 
process, such as a specific mental image, are put forward as ob-
jects for scrutiny. In Projection Performance: Physical Descriptions 
of the Brain a mental image of the brain is the content. In The 
Zavkhan Abstract, the object is the photograph as an analog for 
an instant of visual perception. In A Small Replica of the Act of 
Conveying Meaning it is the sound of the text being read.  
horror is not the defining characteristic of everyday life. 
A thought experiment to bring to light the grist of the ques-
tion: If a an amoeba has a lesser experience of the world than 
us because of the constraints of its physiology, then what con-
straints are we subject to? The projects presented here are ex-
clusively concerned with human experience, but by bringing 
up the ways in which human and animal experiences differ, 
I hope to point to the specificity of this experience. Human 
experience is equally dependent on the physical instantiations 
of out bodies (namely our brains, but not exclusively) as animal 
experience is on their bodies. Human experience is not an ab-
solute, and it depends on our bodies as a perceptual apparatus. 
The differences in our material forms translates into differences 
in our perceptual and cognitive experience. Even though we 
may feel as though our properly functioning senses allow us to 
have a complete picture of the world around us, even this "full" 
experience is mediated by our bodies to exclude lots of poten-
tial information about our surroundings.  Just as different ani-
mal experiences seems to differ in "strength" and significance, 
human experience lies somewhere on the same multi-dimen-
sional map. Each dimension is a sense, and what we think, feel, 
and know is dependent on this location.
I believe that these differences are primarily qualitative among 
humans. An analogy: We generally have arms and legs, tor-
sos and heads, even though in each of these categories, ev-
ery human being will have a different version of that shared 
characteristic. One set of arms is hairy, another short, another 
pale, another strong, and so on. Similarly we all have thoughts, 
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category of this spectrum. Op-art, characterized by artists like 
Bridget Riley, played with visual perception using a traditional 
canvas and paint medium. Other artists, Carsten Höller for ex-
ample, also aims to create fun/wacky/exciting experiences by 
playing with perception, like the Op-artists, however he does 
this in the framework of non-disciplinary media that could be 
alternatively construed as sculpture, installation,  performance, 
or other media. Robert Morris is an artist who similarly works 
in non-disciplinary media, but whose work, in stark contrast 
to Höller, is engaged in reflecting on perceptual and conscious 
experience without providing a framed version of a particular 
experience.  My interest has the most in common with Morris's 
as an attempt to reflect on consciousness and perception, in-
cluding the philosophical puzzles brought up by these subjects. 
Unlike the other examples I have mentioned, these projects 
have no aspiration to use our knowledge of perception to un-
derstand art or to make better art on unrelated topics. They do 
not simulate, play with, or deliver experiences as the artwork. 
Instead, they reflect on the unknown element of the processes 
of perception and cognition, and examine the language that is 
used to communicate on these topics. 
Unlike in these inquiries into other types of relationships be-
tween art and consciousness/perception, Morris’s form of re-
flective inquiry brings the problematics of the hard and easy 
problems into focus. The fascinating dialectic between a ma-
terialist and a dualist perspective is an element of the work 
because perception/cognition does not need to be represented 
as a well understood process. Birren, for example, has to put 
forward a solid theory of perception in order to make the claim 
There are many reasons that artists have become interested in 
consciousness, which correspond to specific relationships that 
art and consciousness can fit into. Both the source of my inter-
est and the relationship between the context that I investigate 
and the work are in the minority, so I want to disambiguate 
my interests from those of others who have used very similar 
terminology, but held entirely distinct aims. One major route 
of investigation is how theories of consciousness and percep-
tion can be used to interpret artwork. i.e.: ' in light of new in-
formation about perspective we can now reexamine the work 
of Piero della Francesca in such and such a way' or the famous 
interpretation of Seurat's technique, that the dots of colors uti-
lize simultaneous contrast for a more vibrant image. Follow-
ing from this, Faber Birren's book Color Perception in Art is an 
example, is the position that artists can benefit from advances 
in the theories of perception. In this case the author states that 
non-objective art can make advances in its use of color, in light 
of new information about the way that color is perceived. These 
types of studies use scientific information about consciousness 
and perception to inform them about art whose content has 
nothing to do with those topics, or to suggest ways that artists 
can make use of the information of fields such as neuroscience 
or gestalt psychology in order to make art in various established 
traditions, generally pre-1960's. The direction of this relation-
ship is to use consciousness and perception to understand or to 
make art. The opposite direction is also prominently theorized 
and investigated. This field from art to conscious/perception, 
rather than consciousness/perception to art, is characterized by 
another host of differing relationships. I fall into a narrow sub-
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her car – she was able to react on the basis of that situation.’ Or 
one could say ‘he was conscious of the history of racial preju-
dice in the town and thus made an effort to act sensitively – he 
made deliberate and complex actions based on integration of 
information. Consciousness can also be used in the basic sense 
of awareness. One could say then that a squirrel is functioning 
consciously and mean that the squirrel is capable of say, run-
ning away from a dog, but stay short of meaning that the squir-
rel took deliberate action or had verbal report based because it 
was consciousness, as one could say for humans. 
All of these functions can be explained scientifically. For some 
of them, advanced work on the explanation has already been 
done. While we don’t yet have full and adequate explanations 
for all of them, they are clearly susceptible to scientific method 
in the same way that other questions of biology can be satisfied. 
What is being searched for here is a physical mechanism by 
which to explain the function. However this isn’t the case for 
all problems of consciousness. That is, neuroscientists can study 
computational and neural mechanisms and give a mechanistic 
explanation as to how one is able to report one’s internal state 
or how activity in two different area of the brain are coordi-
nated, but these explanations do not address a crucial aspect of 
consciousness: the experience. 
Antonio Damasio defines it as “the feeling of what happens,”17 
Thomas Nagel the “something it is like”18 to be a conscious or-
17 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in 
the Making of Consciousness (Mariner Books 2000) 1.
18 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford Univer-
that artists can begin to use color in a new way. It leaves no 
room for doubt, examination of presuppositions, holes in the 
theory etc. because those projects would undermine his argu-
ment. Nevertheless, there is no verified theory of perception, 
and so this type of project requires the glossing over of huge 
questions and contentions. By examining theories of percep-
tion rather than using them for other purposes I am able to 
avoid this artifice. 
DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGY AND LOCATING 
THE EXPLANATORY GAP
Consciousness, perception, thought, etc. are confusing terms 
because they can alternatively refer to either or both the func-
tions and the sensations of these phenomena. In addition they 
are often used to refer to different things. Let me take con-
sciousness as the exemplar, because the definition of conscious-
ness has already been well delineated. Consciousness is com-
prised of physical brain functions that allow humans to do a 
variety of things; discriminate, categorize, and react to envi-
ronmental stimuli; integrate information by a cognitive sys-
tem; report mental states; access internal states; focus attention; 
control behavior; and be generally awake16. 
Being able to perform these functions is attributed to having 
consciousness. We use the term consciousness in reference to 
these functions in a few different ways. For example one could 
say, ‘she is conscious of that traffic light because she stopped 
16 David Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness (New York: Oxford 
University Press 2010) 4.
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vivid, personal experiences? We can explain to some extent the 
function of brains, and can expect to be able to fully explain 
their function eventually, but once this work is done, there is 
still a significant question left unanswered. How do the func-
tions give rise to experience? This is the “explanatory gap”21 
There is now a debate amongst philosophers over what type 
of knowledge might be able to fill this gap. There are also, of 
course, postulations of psychophysical laws that might bridge 
the explanatory gap, although these are mostly still speculation, 
like this conclusion by Chalmers: 
“I suggest that a theory of consciousness should take experi-
ence as fundamental. We know that a theory of conscious-
ness requires the addition of something fundamental to our 
ontology, as everything in physical theory is compatible with 
the absence of consciousness. We might add some entirely new 
nonphysical feature, from which experience can be derived, 
but it is hard to see what such a feature would be like. More 
likely, we will take experience itself as a fundamental feature of 
the world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time. If we take 
experience as fundamental, then we can go about the business 
of constructing a theory of experience.”22
ARTISTIC METHODOLOGY:
The poem and the experiment, two models of investigation 
with highly historical identities, are the models that have be-
come touchstones for my projects. The element of the schema 
21 A term coined by Joseph Levine, 1983.
22 Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, Section 6.
ganism. This essential quality of being alive is what is at ques-
tion regarding consciousness. The sensation of being conscious, 
seeing colors, hearing music, feeling pain and pleasure are the 
fundamental qualities of experience. It is the quality of the first 
person perspective, the experience of being one’s self, being 
inside of one’s brain. David Chalmers posited the explanation 
of this phenomenon as the hard problem of consciousness, by 
making the following claim:
“When it comes to conscious experience, this sort of expla-
nation fails. What makes the hard problem hard and almost 
unique is that it goes beyond problems about the performance 
of functions. To see this, note that even when we have ex-
plained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral 
functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimi-
nation, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there 
may still remains a further unanswered question: Why is the 
performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A 
simple explanation of the functions leaves this question open.”19
Why aren’t our minds just machines? It’s plausible that we could 
live and function without the quality of consciousness or ex-
perience, much like we generally imagine computers or other 
objects to exist20 (there is a debate to be had here with those 
who believe in something called panpsychism, but leaving it 
just at the level of common intuition, it would seem uncontro-
versial) Why is it that the process of perception ends in these 
sity Press 1986) 15.
19 Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, Section 3.
20 See Chalmers’ Zombie agument for further explanation.
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nature. My methodology is something that has evolved, rather 
than something that I explicitly determined. There is a certain 
perversity and transgression inherent in the reconstruction of 
non-rational experience out of the residue of reasoned knowl-
edge that give the projects traction.
The experiment is another schema, although in this instance 
I appeal to a more selective and personal interpretation of the 
form, as opposed to the poem, which as a term of method in 
visual arts practice seems to have a more widely accepted un-
derstanding. The crux of the experiment is to put a proposi-
tion before an audience. The work is the proposition, but is 
not necessarily a hypothesis in the formal sense. There is not a 
representation of a fact or a theory that is meant to be verified. 
Rather, the test is how a set of objects and actions with unde-
termined meanings are catalyzed by the interpretation of oth-
ers. Certain projects such as “Machine that Renders Meaning” 
and “Vision and Cognition, Inscape and Field” use the notion 
of experiment in a more formal sense as well. Their mode of 
address to an audience contains some of the codified elements 
of experimentation such as instructions and rule boundaries. 
This is not as significant to the overall practice, as it is a oc-
casional stylistic element rather that a fundamental structure, 
in the way that experimental form in the first, broader sense is. 
The ultimate expression of this artistic investigation is the con-
struction of an experience for a number of people. Objects and 
actions that I generate meet the free will of an audience, who 
pick up the thread that I lay down and do with it or think 
with it what they will. This experience is constructed out 
of a poem that is most important to my appropriation is the pre-
sumption that each aspect of a composition bears an aesthetic, 
intuitive, and multi-layered relationship to the other elements 
surrounding it. What in a poem would be sound, order, direct 
meaning, associated meaning, and sometimes visual appear-
ance; the elements of composition, are of course different in 
conceptually based visual art. The elements of the composition 
of these projects consist of denotation and connotation of the 
words (usually names) associated with the object, the formal as-
pects of the objects such as material, shape, and color, the rela-
tionship of the objects to location, often the social significance 
of that location as well as the relationships in space and time 
between the compositional elements, the actions implicated by 
the object, such as looking, reading, or touching. Fragments 
of knowledge and definitional words are recombined to create 
multiple pathways through a network of meaning. This non-
rational approach should be distinguished from "irrationality", 
meaning a misuse of the principles of logic. The non-rational 
is instead the abandonment of those principles in favor of a new 
set of criteria with the intent of a new purpose, such as creat-
ing a composition that can be interpreted in multiple ways by 
others. 
This non-rationality, exercised on empirical materials, materi-
als which would not exist except for the framework created by 
the enlightenment notion that humanity can espouse reason, 
is artistically necessary as a tool which frees the content of the 
material from any claim or allusion to progress. If there is any 
assertion inherent in the work, it may be that this thing has 
determined its own methodology, and that this is its inflexible 
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of concepts that I draw from texts that have been developed 
empirically and analytically in order to explain the nature of 
perception and the physical world, as well as related problems 
of language, representation, and the epistemological problems 
that come from the multi-directional approach of the numer-
ous disciplines who hold a stake in the matter. Any one of these 
pathways of meaning can contribute to the questioning of the 
traditional language systems that are used to denotate elements 
and functions of cognitive and perceptual systems.
Throughout the time that I have developed this methodology I 
have had different feelings about its effectiveness. There are the 
complex comparisons that can be made between this method-
ology and that of other artists. No doubt it is similar to that of 
many artists, but also, and more often from my own perspec-
tive, a transgression against the opacity on the one hand, and 
the culturally normative on the other, tendencies of many of 
my artist peers. That is, work that is conceptually transparent, 
whose elements are clearly justified often have a implied no-
tion of the way a social situation should be, or might be if not 
for a villain in the story. Work that lacks that agenda or ethical 
intent often is entirely opaque. I hope to avoid both of these 
structures in favor of a transparency that does not serve a nor-
mative purpose. 
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I
ISOLATION OF AN ASPECT OF 
PERCEPTION: GEOMETRY
 If our knowledge of the world around us is the content of 
our perception, what is its form? This form can be termed the 
‘geometry or structure of perception’ My conception of the ge-
ometry of perception is at the center of the conceptual frame-
work of a series of projects that I have worked on during my 
two years at M.I.T. The form is something of which we are 
normally unaware in everyday experience. Since the form is 
completely stable and constant under normal circumstances, 
it is the first thing that our minds tune out of awareness. As 
important information is weeded out from the background 
information that comes though our senses, the form of these 
communiques is relegated to the perceptual junk pile, since it 
is information that isn’t important to the task at hand. By ne-
cessity, one of the central purposes of our perceptual process 
is to eliminate all of the superfluous information that is in our 
environment. Yet the form of our perceptions is inherent in ev-
erything we perceive about the world, and, in a certain sense, 
within our thoughts, memories, and internal sensations. My 
projects aim to make this information salient again, by direct-
ing attention back towards the form. 
Think of your own visual field as you read this page. You are 
aware of yourself being able to see and interpret the shapes and 
colors of the page or computer screen in front of you. However 
you are not aware of the shape of this field. Imagine that there 
is a picture frame surrounding your field of vision. What is the 
shape of this frame? You cannot see what’s going on behind 
you head, but you can see what’s going on in front. Where is 
the boundary between this field of information, and the ab-
sence of that information? Even if you look for it, you cannot 
see where all of this information becomes obscure at the end 
of your peripheral vision. This border is one small aspect of a 
complex geometry of human perception. 
When we look at a photograph, painting, or screen we are able 
to perceive the borders along with the information contained 
in them. We take this border to be a significant element of 
the experience of the image, shaping its character and mode 
of communication. If it were to be different, the meaning of 
the image would change. The premise of my interest in per-
ceptual geometry is that we might learn something important 
if we temporarily grant equal significance to this all-pervasive 
framing of all of our a posteriori knowledge. That is, all of the 
knowledge that we gain empirically, through observation of 
the world. 
In the sense of which we can be consciously aware of the shape 
of a picture frame, we are not aware of the shape of our own 
visual field. In another sense however, this shape is constantly 
present in our phenomenal consciousness. In other words, the 
shape is perceived, because our consciousness is of that shape. 
Just as the shape is a necessary element of sight, the way in 
which concepts are formed and exist must also have a geometry 
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that is present in our phenomenal consciousness. The way that 
memory informs experience must have a geometry as well. In 
all of these instances this higher level geometry can be under-
stood from the first person perspective of phenomenal experi-
ence. Imagining this geometry from one’s own perspective is 
the first step towards forming a comparison between the un-
mediated experience and the experience mediated by language.
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Munsell expected that the formalized color system that he cre-
ated would be used in the same way that the system of musical 
scales is used. When one hears the phrase B-minor applied 
to something like a symphony, one knows something specific 
about that piece of music. I believe that he envisioned that in 
the future, one might use the term R 8/5 when speaking about 
the shade of the apple one ate yesterday. He thought that our 
color terms like “baby blue” and “blood red” would be re-
placed by numbers for greater accuracy. 100 years later, we can 
see that his prediction was pretty far off. There was an element 
of the project that Munsell never mentioned that I wanted to 
resurrect. 
What Munsell stumbled upon accidentally, when he discov-
ered that, according to his measurements, the shape was ir-
regular, was a depiction of the human color space. The points 
protruding farthest from the central axis  are the colors that ap-
pear the most saturated at a particular value. [Notice the colors 
“Our present color names are incongruous, irrational, and often ludi-
crous. This year the fashionable shades are “burnt onion” and “fresh 
spinach.” The florists talk of a “pink violet” and a “green pink.” A 
maker of inks describes the red as a “true crimson scarlet,” which is a 
contradiction in terms. These and a host of other misnomers, borrowed 
from most heterogeneous sources, become outlawed as soon as the simple 
color names and measure of this system are adopted. Color anarchy is 
replaced by systematic color description.”1
     
 - Albert Henry Munsell
This was Munsell’s vision for his color system, which takes a set 
of data to create a functional map of human color vision. He 
was an artist and teacher from Massachusetts, and the first to 
formalize a system that proposed three distinct dimensions in 
order to create a color space – hue, value, and chroma, in 1905. 
At first, the hope was that this color space could be mapped 
onto a geometric solid, as seen in the  original illustration from 
Munsell’s publication of his research.  
Visually Color Graph contributes nothing to the Munsell color 
system that it is based on. It distorts the system, because it fails 
to depict all of the neutral tones that would be represented if 
one were to hypothetically slice the form. Every interior point 
should also have its own color, which is why Munsell repre-
sented the solid in graphs of cross sections, rather than as a solid 
form. 
1 Albert Henry Munsell, A Color Notation (Boston: G. H. Ellis Co, 1905)
Clause 131. 
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system for greater accuracy, not as a reference for the color of 
soil samples2, but as a picture of an invisible element of our per-
ception. By casting the form in metal, unifying the colors in a 
continuous flow over the surface of the image (often the colors 
are separated into swatches, as seen in the following image) the 
functionality of the form is erased, and the conceptual content 
of the form is fore grounded. 
2 Its first functional use. 
painted on the surface of Color Graph correspond to the degree 
of protrusion.] It could not accurately be mapped onto a sphere, 
as seen bellow, because nothing about our eyes, our perceptual 
process of color recognition, or our cognitive process of color 
naming fits into perfect geometric forms. It has a form of it 
own. My intention was to bring to light this unrecognized 
aspect of the Munsell color system, to set aside Munsell’s in-
tentions, in order to show how this form can be used, not as a 
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FOVEA CAMERA
Project Description:
[This unrealized project is a drawing apparatus that would 
show the geography of the visual field through the drawing 
of the participant.  The system would consist of a chair for 
a participant to sit in with a drawing surface and materi-
als on a table in front of the chair. The object of the par-
ticipant would be to draw a tableau of objects positioned on 
the table. The participant could see the tableau through a 
window in an opaque wall separating him from the objects. 
This circular window would be like the aperture of a camera, 
consisting of a shutter that would be able to open and shut 
in fractions of a second, except considerably larger than any 
existing shutter. If the window was open it would be possible 
to see the entire tableau on the other side of the barrier wall 
through a transparent sheet of Plexiglas. On the glass would 
be a dot in the very center of the visualized scene. This shut-
ter would be connected to a camera that would track the eye 
movement of the participant. When the participant looked 
at the dot, the shutter would open. When the pupils of the 
eyes pointed in a different direction the shutter would close. 
Paper and drawing materials would be placed nearby. A 
display of drawings would accumulate over time.]
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     1 
1 O.J. Gruesser, Fundamentals of Sensory Physiology. (New York: Springer-
Verlag) 1978
Because we rely on a very small area of our visual field for the 
majority of our visual information, called the fovea, we always 
point our eyes towards the objects of inspection, so as to align 
the fovea with the area of interest. When we normally draw 
an object, as each small piece of the scene is rendered, the fo-
vea is used to address that individual piece. In this scenario, 
the fovea would only be allowed to view the very center of 
the image, just as it is the center of the visual field. For every 
point radiating out from the center, the part of the visual field 
corresponding to that point would be forced to do the work 
of rendering that aspect of the image. Thus, as the participant 
drew the scene seen through the window, he could only draw 
the very center of the image clearly, the aspect of the scene 
seen through the fovea. This area of the drawing would appear 
normal. The areas of the table seen through the peripheral ele-
ments of the visual field could only be drawn to the degree that 
could be seen by the radiating weaker pieces of the visual field. 
The result would be the geometry of the visual field mapped 
onto a piece of paper. 
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MACHINE THAT RENDERS 
MEANING
The idea for this project came about after the significance of 
language to the structural mapping of the phenomenology of 
color became apparent through my research for the Color Graph 
project. The distribution of color names and color qualia of the 
visual spectrum has been a prototype for the linguistic relativ-
ity debate, over a universal phenomenology versus a relative 
phenomenology that is mediated differently by various lan-
guages. Besides color terms there are very few of words1 that 
allow the a direct mapping of a perceptual experience onto a 
physical dimension of the world. Words such as big, small, and 
loud, are impossible to instantiate in any objective physical way 
in the same way as it is possible for color terms2. 
The relativist position references a belief that color naming 
across languages is a matter of arbitrary linguistic convention 
and that these differences cause corresponding differences in 
color cognition. The universalist position generally held that 
neither of these propositions was the case. Rather than state 
my own position on the matter, since I believe that both posi-
tions may be true in different circumstances, I decided to make 
a survey system that would allow participants to test the way 
that their own individual color spectra mapped onto English, 
and how this mapping differed from their friends and from the 
averages of the community of participants. 
1 Those that exist refer to elements of texture and taste.
2 E.H. Lenneberg, “The Relationship of Language to the Formation of 
Concepts,” Synthese 14, (1962):103-109.
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Project description:
[The machine is a spherically shaped glass ball attached wireless to a computer display. Although it is electronic, filled with touch sensitive sensors, the sphere 
moves freely, sitting unattached on a felt nest, so that every surface on the sphere can be touched. A layer of paint inside of the glass shows a two dimensional 
color space. Around the circumference of the sphere is the visible color spectrum, a continuous progression from red to orange to yellow to green to violet to red. 
None of the divisions reflected by the color names are apparent in this continuum. The second dimension is value, the scale from dark to light which maps 
to the axis of the sphere. The poles of the sphere are white and black, the extremes of the value spectrum. Beneath the paint is a grid of capacitive sensors 
made of copper pads. This grid can determine where a single finger has been placed on the exterior surface of the sphere, discriminating between differences 
of half an inch or greater. This information is relayed to a computer interface via a bluetooth transmitter.
I am currently working to learn to build the software that will be able to render the information conveyed from the microprocessors in the device, which process 
the electrical signals from a finger touch. A rendering of the final interface is seen in the following images. 
People who encounter the sculpture in public space will be asked to outline the borders of each of the 6 color names by tracing a path on the surface of the 
sphere with a finger. 
The first question is: Where is your spectrum? 
The screen will then read: Please draw a line around every shade of red. Try not to include an shade of orange, violet, white, or black. 
As one draws with a finger this path, a line corresponding to the shape of the outline will appear on the screen. Once the outline is closed, the path remains 
on the screen in black. Superimposed over this outline, the outlines of previous participants appear in grey. The first to appear is the imprint of the last par-
ticipant (perhaps someone who is standing next to you or came with you to the exhibit) Then the outlines of everyone else who has previously participated 
show up in cumulatively faster succession, within the next few seconds. The disparity between the current participant and the range of the whole community 
are graphically compared according to the outline corresponding to a single color name. Then the image disappears and question about the next color comes 
on to the screen. The process is repeated until all of the primary monolexemic color names in English are recorded. Through the aggregation of information 
in this graphic interface, participants would be able to see how great a variation occurs between two people, and where an individual stands in relationship 
to the community of participants.
The sphere is intended to be placed in a space that is indoors, but that is filled with natural light during the day, near a glass wall or window. The reflective 
colors are seen in different light temperatures according to the time of day, both via the changing hue of the sunlight throughout the day and the artificial light 
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source at night. The time of the survey would be recorded along with the graphical data of each survey. This would allow for the observation as to whether 
the recorded shapes moved according to the temperature of light in the room. This would provide an anecdotal answer as to whether perception of color was 
dependent or independent of reflective light source, within this scenario.]
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structures to propose alternate conceptions of common objects 
for the viewer. The primary structures I am interested in are 
Saussure’s ‘langue’ and ‘parole.’ The langue, meaning tongue, is 
the abstract system of language internalized by a given speech 
community. The domain of the langue contains every intended 
meaning of each meaningful speech act, en masse. The parole is 
the individual act of speech. When a person speaks a word at a 
particular moment, the meaning of this individual speech act, 
rather than the meaning of the word in general, is denoted as the 
speech act. The langue consists of all of the individual paroles, 
and the system, the langue, determines the meaning of each act 
of speech. 
Think of the langue as a large circle on a flat plane. Each circle 
is a word. Within the circle are an infinite number of points. 
Each of these points is a parole, an individual meaning con-
veyed through that word as spoken by an individual person. In 
this conception the word itself is a boundary, not a “thing” or a 
“meaning.” The boundary separates meanings that wouldn’t be 
commonly associated with the word, with meanings that would. 
A point outside of the circle world have a different meaning 
than would be commonly understood by that word. Over time 
the location of the circle might change, or it might grow or 
shrink, including different points than it had previously accord-
ing to the semantic shifts that happen over time in language. 
With this graphical understanding of the word and meaning, 
new sorts of spacial questions can be posed. For example what 
speech act, or meaning would lie at the center of this circle? 
Where exactly is this boundary? As in, at what point does the 
II
A GEOMETRY OF LANGUAGE
The structure of language is intimately tied to the question of 
the unique geometry of human cognitive processes. An impor-
tant influence over the past two years has been the structuralist 
linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. The structures which he de-
veloped to speak about the representational nature of language 
have served as a tool for me to picture graphic relationships be-
tween concepts in The Machine that Generates Meaning, Langue/
Parole Grid Project, and The Table Project. Saussure’s project was to 
create a formal system of language by generating differential ele-
ments that could be analyzed in order to try to leave behind the 
messy and complex problems of language in use. His project was 
in certain ways similar to Henry Munsell's, an attempt to formal-
ize and classify a natural set of contents into a functional system. 
Rather than color phenomena, the contents were the elements 
of language. The aim was to analyze the structure of language in 
a rigorous and uniform way. Contemporary linguists still hold 
this aim, although it seems to have become more and more 
clear, as so many attempts have failed, that language, an infinitely 
more complex natural system, is not susceptible to classification 
in the way that sound and color can be mapped onto functional 
scales. Since Saussure's time contemporary linguists have come 
understand that the only productive way to study language is 
in use, so his ideas are largely considered outdated. My inter-
est in Saussure's systems, like Munsell's also, is to reinterpret the 
system for a different purpose. In the following project I use his 
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at how much the borders of the shape vary and how much they 
differ in size. Any given parole can be compared to the langue, 
by looking at an individual outline in comparison to this added 
up form. 
meaning depart from the specified word? Is it fuzzy? (Would 
equivalent portions of people say that the meaning coincides 
and doesn’t coincide with the word?) 
The Machine that Renders Meaning project was designed to 
collect and record the parole and reflect the langue of the color 
names red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet. The form of 
the survey is a type of experiential proposition on the subjec-
tivity of color perception and conditional relativity. Why color? 
Color appears on a spectrum – red becomes orange becomes 
yellow becomes green becomes blue becomes violet becomes 
red. Within the prior sentence you see the divisions that we have 
imposed on this continuum in order to have discrete signifiers 
for regions within the spectrum, so color is a prime subject for 
this type of experiment. The questions asked through the proj-
ects, seen through the lens of Saussure's structure are: Where 
is the langue? What is it's shape? How homogeneous are the 
parole? Does the langue move over time? Because the langue 
that we have for color names is turned into a graphic form (the 
outline) all of these questions develop literal spacial answers. The 
langue for red has a real location that can be drawn onto the 
sphere. It has a specific, meaningful shape, relative to the colors 
that appear on the surface of the sphere. These shapes are the 
same as paroles, since they are individual instances of mean-
ing assigned to a particular sign. The only difference is that the 
meaning is visual and can be recorded. The langue can be seen 
if all of the outlines for a given color name are stacked on top of 
one another and then all of the lines that fall inside the shape are 
erased. This largest outline is the langue for this particular com-
munity of participants. The paroles can be compared by looking 
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at their most paradigmatic. The idea would be that a red brick, 
because it is the most iconic, generalized color for a brick would 
be closer to the apex of the meaning of the word “brick” than 
a yellow brick, which would be closer still than a blue brick. 
Because blue bricks are extremely rare, the red brick is what 
comes to mind when one thinks of a brick in general. Not just 
color, but all attributes, including the choice of the object, were 
‘tuned’ to this point.
I had the idea of wanting to represent this graphic structure 
without indicating it verbally, such that the objects themselves 
would serve as the “utterance” that is required for something to 
be a parole. The challenge of course was to create a structure that 
would allow the object to speak for itself, because simply placing 
a shoe or a rock on a pedestal, with no other context would be 
so abstracted from the initial idea that the piece would have no 
meaning. I made a series of decisions that are intended to protect 
the objects from this opacity. The objects are aligned in a grid, 
itself a paradigmatic form in the artistic context, and a tool that 
demonstrates something about the logical and non-functional 
relationship of these objects to one another. They are placed on 
the floor, in a lobby space–a space that is not otherwise occupied 
by an objects. They are extracted from the contexts of their use; 
the shoe is not on a foot, the cigarettes are not being smoked, 
the brick is not a piece of architecture. Each object is instead 
contextualized by the other objects surrounding it. First by the 
two other objects that are fairly identical to it and secondly by 
the 13 other sets of objects adjacent to its set. The repetition is 
a gesture at the non-arbitrary nature of the object. The choice 
of which object is a paradigm of it’s signifier (although it is a 
LANGUE/PAROLE GRID PROJECT
“At least it hides the face partly. Well, so you have the apparent face, 
the apple, hiding the visible but hidden, the face of the person. It's 
something that happens constantly. Everything we see hides another 
thing, we always want to see what is hidden by what we see. There is 
an interest in that which is hidden and which the visible does not show 
us. This interest can take the form of a quite intense feeling, a sort of 
conflict, one might say, between the visible that is hidden and the visible 
that is present.”
- Renee Magritte on the The Son of Man1
 
This installation is a graphic, object based analysis of the langue/
parole structure. The aspect of langue that interests me, is the 
way that the spacial projection of a word within a language 
system allows for more nuanced propositions about elements 
within the geometry. The focus of this project is literally the 
central element of a specific part of that geometry – the centre 
of the circle. If a word, like “hat” is the langue, and the langue 
is represented by an array of parole, which parole is at the cen-
ter of the array? All of the objects included in this project are 
hypotheses about what the parole at the centre of the langue 
might look like. The implication of this project is that all of the 
elements that possess cultural connotations, the era, color, style, 
shape, source, etc. of the object would have to be tuned to be 
1 ^ In a radio interview with Jean Neyens (1965) cited in Renee Mag-
rite, trans. Richard Millen Torczyner/Magritte: Ideas and Images (New York: 
Harry N. Abrams) 172.
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Project description:
[Three New York Times on the day of exhibition. 
Three sharpened #2 pencils
Three leather gloves
Three felt hats
Three boxed of Marlboro cigarettes
Three piles of sand
Three wooden chairs
Three grey, ovoid stones
Three red bricks
Three live goldfish (in bowls of water)
Three pair of black glasses
Three clocks
Three pairs of black leather shoes
Three books (Dialectics of the Will) 
A grid comprising these objects was laid on the grid of the of the Maki lobby of MIT’s Media Lab. Each line of the grid had three near 
identical objects. The work was visible for approximately 4 hours on a morning in October 2010.]
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bringing their own set of knowledge that grips and becomes 
embedded into the initial platform I establish. The conversations 
that happen between the viewers of the work in which these 
connotations come to light are a significant part of the purpose 
of the work, the instantiation of its conceptual structure, even 
though I can only hope to be minimally aware of what they are.
deeply subjective choice that reflects my opinion primarily), the 
common denominator of all of the objects, is amplified because 
it is shared between all 14 object sets. My intention was that the 
physical objects would be re-objectified for each person who 
saw them,  removed from their sensible contexts.
I am also interested in how this piece functions beyond the level 
at which it can be understood as a graphical depiction of an as-
pect of the langue/parole structure. Some of the objects serve as 
an homage to other artists and artworks, in a reference to how 
they made it possible to use conceptual structures in complex 
ways. The most obvious are Kosuth’s One and Three Chairs, Mag-
ritte’s Son of Man, Felix Gonzales-Torres Untitled (Perfect Lovers), 
and Carl Andres repetitive floor structures in general. However 
these references are lost in a cascade of connotations that fol-
low each of these objects. Any one of the 14 could be visually 
connected to the work of another artist. The reason for this is 
not a complex formula that I came up with during the selection 
of the objects, but the nature of approaching the paradigm of 
any sign. The paradigm, because it is iconic and also because it 
has elements of neutrality because it is so common, and which 
often makes it desirable, will inevitably have been used many, 
many times before, not just in the arena of art, but in all sym-
bolic disciplines. For any person who encounters it, the dense 
array of connotations is apt to be unique, according to her own 
set of knowledge. A juxtaposition occurs between this complex 
network of connotations and the conceptual structure that un-
derlies the work. This is one good example of how the viewer is 
a necessary catalyst for the thing to function. My connotations 
for these objects are irrelevant, the viewer forms the work by 
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THE TABLE PROJECT
This project investigated the meaning of a single signifier, the 
word ‘table,’ within a speech community. Like the two prior 
projects, the foundation of the project is a spacial reification 
of Saussure’s notions of langue and parole. Here the attempt 
is to depict a cross-section of the langue of the word “table” 
through a series of “paroles” – the tables used in the sculp-
ture. The tables were placed in an outdoor walkway in order 
to remove them from a sensible environment, again to help 
indicate the meaning behind their placement. The were ar-
ranged into a linear spectrum, the center objects being those 
that were clearly tables, paradigms of the form. Moving to-
wards the outer limits, the criteria that normally signal that 
an object is a table began to loosen, spreading outward into 
things which might be tables, and then to things which seem 
even less likely to be, but still might be considered tables. First 
tables that had unusual decorative elements that distracted from 
their obvious defining purposes, then tables that were made of 
materials clearly intended for other uses, such as a table made 
of books, then tables with no legs, tables with no structural in-
tegrity, such as one made out of flour, with barely recognizable 
table-like quality, such as a log and a piece of marble. All of the 
instances of tables were physical representation of points within 
the langue of the word table.
Project Statement that was included inside a case within the 
installation:
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A basic summation of the purpose of this project is a test of the 
boundaries of the definition of the word “table”. While ob-
serving my installation and the reactions it received in public, 
I found that it served this purpose quite effectively. Children 
were my best audience, grasping this function immediately. 
One conversation went like this - “this is a table, this is a table, 
this is a table” “no it’s not!” “why not?” “because it doesn’t 
have space on it to eat a snack” “yes I could eat a snack on 
there!” (table had a surface area about 2 inches wide) The kids 
were testing the definition of a table against its functional use 
within their own lives. In this way they were reconciling their 
positions to form a tighter speech community, or, another way 
of looking at it, they were finding the position of the parole to 
see if it was inside or outside of the langue.
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there are many levels to conscious experience. Just a few would 
be attention to a focal object, background noise, background 
smell, peripheral vision, awareness of the position of the body 
and position of the person in space. As I have mentioned be-
fore, the complexity of the process is not at all apparent in 
everyday experience because we have learned to tune out this 
“framing” information. So the simplification is in service of 
revealing the hidden complexity of any of these elements of 
consciousness individually. By reenacting these everyday ac-
tions and the perceptual/cognitive sequence that occurs, I can 
also reconfigure the visual, auditory, and mental components 
of these processes into poetic structures. 
How does the complexity of language fit into of the percep-
tual pathway? The impression of the images, sounds, and sensa-
tions of the world that we have in everyday conscious experi-
ence depends on the language that we have for the objects and 
ideas within our visual, auditory, and other sensory fields. We 
also depend on language for our postulations about how the 
mind works. Although we don’t yet know exactly how it is 
that we learn language, how the connections between things 
and meanings become instantaneously available, we attempt 
to articulate mental structures which crucially depend on lan-
guage. We know that we communicate and that the words 
(and phonemes) in our lexicon serve as fluid building blocks. 
We also know that language effects the aspects of cognition 
and perception outside of acts which directly involve language, 
such as recognition of color and choices of attention within the 
III
INDISTINCT BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND 
COGNITION
The way that the following projects address language is from 
the perspective of language as a structural framework of per-
ceptual and cognitive processes. It turns away from the tradi-
tional linguistic perspective, which analyzes the elements of 
language, and towards a cognitive linguistics. The method-
ology of these projects specifically is to represent simplified 
reenactments of particular sequences of events that occur in 
everyday life; things like looking at a landscape, hearing some-
one speak, smelling food cooking, touching an object, reading 
a text. All of these actions have sequences that can be broken 
down into finer-grained versions, with more minute sections. 
Why are they simplified? The word simplified here is correct, 
but somewhat misleading, because the chain of actions that is 
the subject is extraordinary complex. Zoomed in is another 
way to describe it. Many of the sequences functional aspects 
are not yet explained by science, and all of them are underlined 
by the hard problem of consciousness. When I simplify I mean 
that I choose important aspects of the sequence and replace the 
“kaleidoscopic flux”1 with one object or one text so that the 
complexity of the process can be brought to light. In actual life, 
1 Whorf ’s great shorthand for all of the information available to see, 
hear, touch, etc.
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they are enacted at one time, are seen as accumulating in prior 
and subsequent days, since each day is a recapitulation of the 
unit of the current moment.4 Thus there is evidence to support 
both the relativist and the universalist sides of the debate.
 It seems possible to imagine that our concrete concepts like 
‘table’ or ‘television’ would exist without the particular signi-
fiers that we are accustomed to assigning them. These are units 
of physical matter that have corresponding divisions between 
mental and physical space. However when you think of more 
abstract concepts, the possibility that the borders fail to align 
through physical and mental projections becomes much more 
plausible. Take the abstract concept ‘factor’. Factor is defined 
as: “A circumstance, fact, or influence that contributes to a re-
sult or outcome.”5 It’s plausible to conceive of that the abstract-
ed concept “factor” (though not the actual phenomena that 
in English we happen to call “factors”) would never enter the 
awareness of a person who never learned a word equivalent to 
the meaning of ‘factor’ Anything in the world can be termed 
factor. Even more so than ‘television’ or ‘table,’ our conception 
of ‘factor’ is deeply tied to its location within our particular 
linguistic landscape. Although it seems that all of the words in 
our lexicon come about because they name something about 
the world, and they function adequately as signifiers in our lan-
guages6, many may have developed not because of any natural 
kind in the world, but out of arbitrary circumstances. The huge 
4 Ekkehart Malotki, Hopi Time: A Linguistic Analysis of the Temporal Con-
cepts in the Hopi Language (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter) 1983.
5 Wikipedia entry, Factor, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factor (May 
10, 2012)
6 Those that don’t disappear from the lexicon.
visual field2. In other words, language seems to effect the way 
that we think and the things that we notice.
Is the nature of language a cause or an effect of the cognitive 
structures that allow us to navigate the world? The causal story 
between language and conceptual structure is a complex and 
long standing debate. Universalists are apt to believe that the 
deep conceptual structure of language is common to all hu-
mans, regardless of differences within their linguistic cultures. 
Relativists oppose this view by putting forward evidence of 
how the same stimulus is interpreted in different ways accord-
ing to the language through which it is filtered. While we 
know that we use language to process external stimuli, how 
this functions at different levels is still contentious. It is clear 
from experimental data that there is a relation between the 
speed of mental processing and the availability of words for a 
stimulus, but this provides direct evidence only of a superfi-
cial relationship. For example, a recent experiment showed that 
English speakers, who have one word for many shades of blue 
are slower to recognize a blue stimulus than Greek speakers, 
who have distinct terms for light blue (ghalazio) and dark blue 
(ble)3. However the implications of these experiments as to the 
deep conceptual structures is still unknown. In a commonly 
sighted example on the relativist side, the language of Native 
American language of the Hopi, lacks verb tenses that indicate 
time. As a result their culture involves rituals, that, although 
2 Roger Brown, Eric H. Lenneberg, “A Study in Language and Cogni-
tion,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 49, (1954): 454-462.
3 Panos Athanasopoulos, “Cognitive Representation of Colour in Bi-
linguals: The Case of Greek Blues.” Bilingualism: Language and Cognition 
12 (2009): 83-95.
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WHAT IS THE PERCEPTUAL 
PATHWAY?
“Perception (from the Latin perceptio, percipio) is the process 
of attaining awareness or understanding of the environment 
by organizing and interpreting sensory information. All per-
ception involves signals in the nervous system, which in turn 
result from physical stimulation of the sense organs. For exam-
ple, vision involves light striking the retinas of the eyes, smell 
is mediated by odor molecules and hearing involves pressure 
waves. Perception is not the passive receipt of these signals, but 
can be shaped by learning, memory and expectation. Percep-
tion involves these “top-down” effects as well as the “bottom-
up” process of processing sensory input. Perception depends 
on complex functions of the nervous system, but subjectively 
seems mostly effortless because this processing happens outside 
conscious awareness.”9
Perception can be thought of as the pathway between the phys-
ical world and the mental environment. Information passing 
along this path is some kind of synthesis between an objec-
tive reality and the prior knowledge and conceptual capacities 
of individuals. What we term objective reality is that which 
doesn’t appear to vary between normal mature humans. How-
ever this objectivity, as with all of our knowledge of the world, 
can’t be judged from an objective viewpoint. It is through the 
lens of our own subjectivity that we judge objectivity itself, so 
9 Wikipedia entry ‘Perception’ : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Percep-
tion (April 29, 2012).
host of words that lack decent translations into other languages 
is evidence of this . Similarly, other fundamental abstractions 
like time and dimensionality, might be conceived in entirely 
different ways if they were termed differently. When we form 
thoughts that call on the notions of 3-D or time, or when we 
recognize notions like time and 3-dimensionality, they may 
dictate the way in which we understand the world perceptu-
ally. In this way understanding something about the relation-
ship of meaning to language through conceptual structures is 
an essential part of the higher end of the perceptual pathway.
Theories of linguistic relativity take this to much more sophis-
ticated levels of analysis. For example the two related hypoth-
eses of linguistic relativity, 1) Different linguistic communi-
ties perceive and conceive reality in different ways, and 2) The 
language spoken in a community helps to shape the cognitive 
structure of the individuals speaking that language7, may not 
both be true, although the classic Sapir/Whorf hypothesis as-
sumes that language evolves based on specific social and physi-
cal environments and that this causes differences in the our 
conceptual systems according to our language conventions.8
Language can be conceived as having several purposes, as a 
repository of the traditions of reason within a culture, a tool 
of communication, and the medium of thought. Each of these 
purposes might be in virtue of the other, which may be central 
to the debates over causality that define this field of inquiry. 
7 Brent Berlin and Paul Kay Basic Color Terms: Their Universality And 
Evolution (Stanford, CA :Center for the Study of Language and Informa-
tion. 1999)
8 Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee 
Whorf.
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have created. The lens, pupil, and extra-ocular muscles orga-
nize and regulate the intensity, focus, direction, and placement 
of the light before it reaches the retina. The retina, actually a 
part of the brain, transduces the photons of light into neuronal 
impulses. This fully conceived physical process can be speci-
fied as sight. Sight is entirely included within visual perception, 
but visual perception doesn’t end with the process of physical 
sight11. Capturing the photons cast on the retina in something 
like a camera sensor or light sensitive chemicals, there would 
be a recognizable image. After this point there is nothing that 
we can point to that is an image per se. From here on the per-
ception lacks the indexical relationship to the physical world 
that we use to determine the origin of the percept. Here it 
becomes clear that what we perceive is not simply a translation 
of the information that is cast on the retina. Like the devices 
of the eye that I mentioned, which pare down the sea of data 
emanating from the things we gaze at, selection and recon-
figuration also occurs as the impulses move through the brain. 
The process of afferent analysis that begins on the surface of the 
retina continues up the optic nerve, so that what was an image 
on the retina is lost and becomes some other pattern that we are 
able to interpret as information about the environment.
11 Churchland, 20.
it is infinitely questionable how much we really know of the 
world, or how great the upper part of the perceptual pathway 
calls into question the information in the lower. The question 
of how we synthesize knowledge, i.e. how the upper end of 
the perceptual pathway functions, is the question of how our 
experiences differ from one another’s. 
My work is primarily concerned with a somewhat abstract no-
tion of perception - the roles of the areas of the perceptual 
pathway and the way that reviving awareness of the geometry 
of perception might be able to change our perspectives. How-
ever there is also a concrete aspect of the perceptual pathway, 
the physical facts of light and retinas, afferent analysis and fir-
ing neurons. This physical pathway is equally important, both 
for justifying our more abstract beliefs and for maintaining the 
connection to the underlying problem of the relationship be-
tween the physical and mental world. 
Sight is one of the denominations that we have evolved to 
specify a mode that humans use to detect the external physical 
world. As we detect, we also modify this information based 
on learned patterns and prior knowledge, a process of inter-
pretation. The retina is the foundation of one of the systems 
of detection, by being sensitive to a narrow range of electro-
magnetic radiation10. Beginning with the cornea, which re-
fracts the light reflecting from what a person is looking at, the 
human eye selectively samples information from the outside 
world that comes from the light energy that bounces off of sur-
faces, weather from the sun or from artificial sources that we 
10 Ibid.
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us to feel oriented, aware of our place in the landscape. This 
abstract notion, the sense of space, is fundamental to identity, 
commerce, navigation, and communication the reason why it 
was an example of an abstract concept that I felt compelled to 
examine.
THE ZAVKHAN ABSTRACT
This photographic project, done in a rural area of in the north-
west of outer Mongolia, is a continuation of a different mode 
of working than the other projects that I present in this thesis. 
My background in photography in many ways led to my in-
terest in perception, because I began to study the photograph 
as an indexical document, which sparked questions about the 
relationship of the photograph to working vision. The primary 
difference in this mode of working is that the notions of per-
ception and cognition are not explicitly addressed in the work, 
rather the structural nature of the photographic series, both 
geographically and conceptually, is informed by a proposition 
about the way that abstraction in built from instances of per-
ception. 
Prior projects in this progression have addressed the Appala-
chian Trail and the highway system between New York and 
Boston. All of these landscapes, the nomadic trail, the footpath, 
and the highway, share the quality that they exceed the scope 
of vision and require us to somehow build the notions that 
represent the entity as a whole.
The Mongolian project as well as the two prior projects com-
prised of taking a sequence of photographs as I walked or drove 
along a path through the land. This structure was based on 
an attempt to imagine the photograph as an analogue of an 
instance of perception. The attempt was then to try to under-
stand how these instances of perception might be compiled into 
an abstract notion of place; the sense of geography that allows 
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Project Description:
[Traveling in the Zavkhan province of Mongolia, I recorded interviews with eight nomadic families. Following instructions from the interviews, I travelled 
along the cyclical paths that the Mongolians follow over the course of a year. This path includes 2 - 4 semi-permanent camps where they erect their homes 
before moving to the next location, and is between 5 and 20 kilometers in length. Over the course of this journey I would take photographs of the landscape 
along the route. A selection of these photographs for each family's route was compiled into a book containing both the photographs and interviews. Each 
interview begins a chapter beside a portrait of the interviewee and their family. Following the interview are sequential photographs of the nomadic pathway 
for that family. ]
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flexible clothing, the mobile homes–have been developed over 
an unknown length of time. Knowledge of weather patterns, 
which are highly dependent on the land formations, is signifi-
cant to their profession. It seemed to be a novelty to look at a 
map of the landscape for most of the families that I met, since 
it is common for Mongolians to navigate their local vicinities 
using natural landmarks. Because there are few built roads and 
horseback is a common form of travel, off-road travel is most 
common, and this type of navigation relies on the recognition 
of the shapes of hills, kinds of vegetation, and other visual ele-
ments of the landscape. Mongolians know these details by rote. 
In Mongolia it is not uncommon for strangers to stop by each 
other’s homes for a cup of tea. This is understandable in light 
of the fact that there is little other infrastructure when travel-
ing between the towns, which can be several days of driv-
ing between one another. Although small roadside food rooms 
are not uncommon since the 1990's. Myself, my guide, and 
two other team members would stop by the house of a fam-
ily and ask if they wouldn’t mind speaking to us, that I was 
photographing the country and that I would like to interview 
them. No one ever turned us down. We would sit to drink 
salty milk tea flavored with mutton, a constant beverage in Za-
vkhan called suutei tsai, and chat for 10 and 20 minutes to get 
acquainted. We would begin the interview based on a series of 
questions which I had had translated:
“Could you describe the nature of your homeland – the geography, ap-
pearance, and importance of the land?
Mongolian culture, through centuries of evolution, developed 
a unique nomadic form of subsistence based upon the steppe, 
the grassland plain amongst the mountains, lakes, and dunes. 
Their homeland is essentially a continuous path. Because this 
path is successively traveled rather than designed to convey trav-
elers to a destination, it has a different function than the roads 
and paths that we tend to encounter in transportation based 
societies. I wondered how Mongolians’ different relationship 
to the land might indicate a different type of conception of the 
landscape, one which is deeply integrated with other aspects of 
their identity and their subjective experiences. 
The northwestern Mongolian landscape is severely continen-
tal, with hot sunny summers and frigid winters, a country 
landlocked between Russia and China. On the steppe there 
is nearly always a sweeping wind and the land is fertile for 
all kinds of grasses, moss and wildflowers. Except for distinct 
patches of dense evergreens, it remains largely clear of trees. 
All of these natural circumstances dictate the native Mongo-
lian way of life, because they make it possible to herd animals 
as an exclusive means of subsistence. Mongolians live off of 
herd animals which they use for milk, meat, and fur, (for trade 
and insulation) so they move with their herds according to the 
season. In the winter they move to sheltered areas in the hills 
to protect their animals, and to be near wooded areas for fuel. 
In the summer they find flatter, more fertile areas to fatten the 
animals in preparation for the winter. 
This pattern of subsistence and all of the accommodations that 
make it sustainable–the domestication of horses, the warm and 
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position (human height) and angle of view (the amount of pic-
ture included in the photograph based on lens length). It lacks 
the multiplicity of objects of a city or a forest, but it has the 
variation of landform that makes it possible to tangibly depict 
the topography of the land. In places dominated by flat desert 
or fields of grain it can be impossible to connote anything even 
akin to the richness of depth that comes from seeing a vast dis-
tance with the benefit of parallax (depth information through 
motion). So this depth is equally due to the lack of flatness. 
The attempt of this project was to understand something about 
visual perception through a photographic process, despite the 
vast differences between vision and photography. In perception 
images are never still, they are impressions that are in virtue of 
the location of our bodies, and the constant movement of our 
eyes. The photograph is by definition still. The movement of 
our bodies creates parallax, which creates depth, as does the 
shift in focus that occurs as one’s eyes roam over distances. Col-
or is relative in vision, but absolute in a photograph when under 
stable light conditions. Photographs are always seen through 
a frame, they have fixed aspect ratios, lens length, sharpness, 
and noise, none of which exist in visual perception. A photo-
graph is a span of time and vision is temporally independent. 
Although I was conscientious of the vast differences between 
a still photographic image and the malleable and subjective 
instances of perception, I thought that something significant 
about the process of abstraction could be revealed through the 
treatment of this conceptual structure as a thought experiment 
about this process in visual sight.
Do you think of one place as your home?
Where is that place?
How large an area is your home?
How does the land affect your life?
Please think about these questions for a while and let me know if you 
have new ideas. I can record your answers when you are ready.”
The interview generally lasted for another 10-20 minutes. I 
carried detailed maps of the area with me, and we would lay 
them out and have the interviewees trace the routes that they 
take over the course of the year. I asked if they would let me 
take a portrait either of the families as a group, a couple, or an 
individual. These are intended to be used as author’s portraits 
alongside the interviews. After this we would try to follow the 
route that they had drawn out, and I would decide on places to 
stop along the route, shooting one or two images at each loca-
tion with either my 4x5 large format or 6x9 medium format. 
The selection of images was based on formal interest in the 
particular area or an aspect of the landscape, a preference for 
diversity between images, and an interest in creating a tangible 
sense of the space and topography of the landscape, attempting 
to represent it as I perceived it. 
The Mongolian landscape is specially visible because of the 
minimal obstruction from trees and architecture, particularly 
from a typical unaltered human perspective in terms of camera 
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The conceptual motivation for the project was very distant 
from the object, the book, that was produced. The book too 
closely resembles other kinds of photography books, whose se-
quence and content has no specific meaning. The project in 
Mongolia led me to the belief that in future projects I would 
be better able to provide generative materials to an audience if 
more explicit relationships between the conceptual motivations 
of the project and the ostensible content of the project were 
presented. These conclusions led me to shift the methodology 
of my projects from being visual analogies of perception, with 
an implied cognitive project, to direct reflections on those pro-
cesses through actions of perception/cognition in a medium 
of performance. Although I still place some demands on the 
imagination of the audience in the following projects, they are 
smaller and less distant from the physical things that the audi-
ence experiences. 
Abstraction here is meant to mean the process by which a form 
of basic information, whether visual, textual, or otherwise, is 
re encoded into a new form, and often compressed, in order 
for the information to be processed by a system according to 
specific requirements. It is important to note that the term ab-
straction is not meant in the sense in which it is frequently ap-
plied in artistic contexts, such as the term ‘abstract painting.’ 
The connotation of some uses of the word abstraction entail 
a departure from structure and formal meaning. My use of 
abstraction is not intended to convey this connotation. On the 
contrary, most of the processes of abstraction to which I refer 
take disordered and unpredictable configurations of informa-
tion and create order, form, and highly directed meaning. Ab-
straction is primarily a way of specifying how a system creates 
distance between a stimulus and a percept. The nature of the 
transformation is not implicitly positive or negative, confusing 
or clarifying. The only absolute under this broadest definition 
is that the information has been transformed.
 We can abstract the information from a series of photographs 
just as we can abstract the information from a visual expe-
rience. Crucial similarities between vision and photography, 
perspective and indexicality, make the comparison unique and 
salient. Because of the inherent differences between vision and 
photography, I expected the project to require a large degree of 
projection or imagination, because I knew that it was impossi-
ble for the photography to mimic vision. This came about from 
a perspective developed while reading Wittgenstein and other 
proponents of the impossible. In retrospect, I think I failed to 
provide an adequate context to allow this to happen. 
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Continuity -
From one moment to another consciousness is a continu-
ous stream of changing sensations. One subject, despite these 
changes has a continuous subjectivity that proceeds from day 
to day and year to year for the extension of the life of the 
conscious being. Except on very rare occasions of trauma, this 
continuity means that when we wake up in the morning, we 
have the knowledge that we are the same person as we were 
yesterday. 
Selectivity -
Although there are innumerable sensations and details that 
could be conscious in the mind of any aware being at any given 
moment, only a finite selection of this information enters into 
consciousness. As I get dressed in the morning, I choose a blue 
dress of which I am consciously aware at the moment of dress-
ing. As the day proceeds and my consciousness changes the se-
lectivity of consciousness necessarily leaves behind the aware-
ness of the blue dress for the majority of the day. The objects of 
consciousness shift to other things such as the story unfolding 
in a book I might read or a street I might walk down; any 
number of other stimuli that deselect the blue dress, although it 
is still present. This selective character of consciousness makes 
it possible for us to function in a world with infinite variability, 
by narrowing the information that we absorb. 
What is perception and what does it have to do with conscious-
ness? By perception, I mean apprehension with the senses and 
mind, a process that begins with the physical world and gives 
IV 
DEFINING CONSCIOUSNESS, 
PERCEPTION, AND COGNITION
The simplest definition of consciousness is awareness of one’s 
self and surroundings. Consciousness applies to the body and 
mental states, in addition to the outside world. This sphere 
of awareness is mostly involuntary; it can be ‘intensional’1 but 
in can also lack this intentionality, and be about nothing in 
particular. Four characteristics have been said to delineate con-
sciousness: subjectivity, change, continuity, and selectivity2. 
Being subjective, it cannot be experienced by any other than 
the conscious being, thus the characteristics of consciousness 
cannot be independently verified. The only knowledge we 
have of conscious qualia are our own direct experiences and 
the indirect report of others with conscious experience. 
Change - 
Conscious experience is constantly changing. From one mo-
ment to another the qualia of any sense, be it the smell of a 
fruit, or the shadow of a chair, the way that we are conscious 
of that sensation changes with our position in space, attention, 
and the changes that occur to the object itself. The piece of 
fruit is eaten, we walk across the room, the surface on which 
the fruit rests draws our attention instead–all imply changes in 
the state of consciousness. 
1 The term is used in analytic philosophy to mean that awareness is 
about something.
2 Chalmers, The Character of Consciousness.
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rise to conscious thought. This conscious sense includes sur-
roundings, noise, feeling, and intermittently, taste and smell. 
Though there are many boundaries here that might be contro-
versial, there are some that seem fairly definite. 
Physical elements of the world, namely matter and light, have 
properties that we are evolved to detect. As we detect, we also 
modify this information based on learned patterns and prior 
knowledge, and thus begin interpreting. For example, in vi-
sion, humans evolved the pathway between light and cogni-
tion described in the earlier section. In this notion, sight is 
entirely included within visual perception, but visual percep-
tion doesn’t end with the process of physical sight. One of the 
greatest complications of understanding vision is that what we 
perceive is not simply a translation of the information that is 
cast on the retina. Like the devices of the eye that I mentioned, 
which refine salient information, selection and reconfiguration 
occurs as the impulses move through the brain. The process of 
afferent analysis begins on the surface of the retina and contin-
ues up the optic nerve, so that the image on the retina is ‘lost’ 
and replaced with information about characteristics of this pat-
tern and eventually becomes about characteristics of the envi-
ronment. At every stage of vision, though in different ways, the 
information is interpreted, and thus perceived. Perception is a 
term that refers to a continuous process from the sense organs 
to the qualities that are consciously experienced.
PROJECTION PERFORMANCE; 
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF THE 
BRAIN
Performance note:
[Five analog overhead projector are arranged in a line spanning approxi-
mately. A freestanding canvas of 40’ x 10’ on a bracketed wooden frame 
is positioned in front of the projectors. Each projector displays a typed 
text at different degrees of focal clarity, on a scale from total clarity to 
near-illegibility. Each text is a one paragraph description of the physical 
brain. The authors of these texts range from Vesalius to a modern day 
neurosurgeon, each with a different intent and historical viewpoint. The 
authors are not indicated. One performer is positioned behind each pro-
jector. There are two younger women, an older man, an older woman, 
and a middle aged man. They are dressed in everyday clothing.
The performance begins with all of the performers reading texts from 
the projected images, each from his own station. They read plainly and 
in normal voices. One must walk up to each performer in order to hear 
their words, as the projector fan noise and their voices blend together at a 
distance. They continue to read the text from beginning to end repeating 
the same paragraph until 5 minutes have passed. At five minutes each 
performer concludes speaking, and turns off his or her projector.]
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This project tests the comprehension of meaning through the 
filters of translation through time, speech, text, and image. As 
the participants read the projected words at various degrees of 
focal clarity, the images that the texts give rise to are modu-
lated by the focus of the text symbols that make up the words 
as well as many other hurdles. In each of the five cases the 
phenomenal experience of the authors encounter with a brain 
is the kernel of meaning that is passed through the system that 
I have constructed. First the kernel is interpreted by the author 
into a text that conveys his or her perception of the brain. Then 
the meaning of this text is perhaps altered through the tempo-
ral context in which it is represented. The temporal context 
of this performance at the M.I.T. Media Lab in the spring of 
2011 is very far removed from that of the some of the texts, and 
much closer to others, hundreds of years in one case, up to just 
a few. Within the actual performance this pathway of meaning 
continues, first through the projection of the text into light, 
and then from this image into the perceptions and then speech 
of the performers. The final instantiation is in the minds of 
the viewers, and the proposition is that they will have a mental 
image that conveys some version of the physical brain that was 
initially experienced by the author of the text. I hope to show 
something about how meaning is affected when the symbols 
that contain the meaning are altered and the endemic nature 
of these filters. 
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A SMALL REPLICA OF THE ACT OF CONVEYING MEANING
Performance Note, (written before the performance as a projection of what would happen)
[I will read from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, a philosophical text about silence and language, in a small replica of the act of conveying 
meaning. Wittgenstein asked what relation subsisted between thoughts, words, and meanings, and this performance is a reenactment of that question. 
I am fascinated by Wittgenstein both because of the nature of his work and the narrative  of his career. He wrote two crucial works, the first of which was the 
Tractatus. Then, he changed his mind about nearly all of his convictions and wrote The Philosophical Investigations. Within the Tractatus, he attempts to 
explain why philosophy cannot be spoken about in a meaning ful way and how our language lacks the very capacity. All the while he has written a stunning 
philosophical work through a precise logical filter, in the form of a numbered list of sentences. From what I know of this work, small pieces will be clear while 
others will dissolve into the abstraction of sound.
The performance will take two parallel courses, one will be at the ocean itself and the other will be within an anechoic chamber (a room padded with foam 
so that no sound permeates the walls or bounces within the space) I see these as representative of the two spacial paradigms of the water - the surface and the 
interior. One has an organic and constant sound and the other is silent, apart from our own noise. The two settings will create a comparison between the 
comprehended meaning of the text, and all three; the text, the ocean, and the anechoic chamber will serve to direct attention towards evaluating the meaning 
of language as well as it’s tactility. 
The sea is a place where normal modes of perceptual orientation are maladapted. Up is not up, space is not empty, and barriers fail to tell us where our bod-
ies belong. In this way the power of the ocean is as a tool of attention, or a catalyst for one’s reevaluation of one’s environment. This is why I feel that this 
project, which is really about creating a hermeneutics of speech, can be simultaneously about and around the ocean in a logical continuum. 
When we read, speak, and listen to language, there is a current of meaning that is passed in greater or lesser accuracy from one participant to another. There 
is an act of interpretation that can take an unknown number of forms. This affects the “inscape” of the interpreter, his private representation of the meaning 
of the speech he has heard. I would like to better understand how meaning passes through the filter of each individual’s speech. Could the act of reading a 
text be like a musician reading a piece of music, wherein the interpretation is taken as in and of itself a work of art?]
This performance was documented in audio, but not photography.
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Invitation to the 
performance:
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of the traditional structure of the artwork.”1
The notion of self-reflexivity or referentiality is either de-
formed by my mode of working or abandoned, as it has been 
by most of the artwork that might be called “post-conceptual”. 
Joseph Kosuth defined self-referentiality as the tautological 
condition of the work, that artwork is and can only be about 
itself and its own condition, for its own sake. Self reflexivity, I 
see as a more liberal term, referring to work that is concerned 
with itself, its viewers, and elements of their condition that 
might affect both the experience of the work itself and the ex-
perience of related content. 
> NOTES ON KOSUTH
The interpretation of theories of analytic philosophy, 
primarily of Wittgenstein and A.J. Ayer were used to jus-
tify the claims of Kosuth’s conceptual ideology:
“What is the function of art, or the nature of art? If we 
continue our analogy of the forms art takes as being art’s 
language, one can realize then that a work of art is a kind 
of proposition presented within the context of art as a 
comment on art. We can then go further and analyze the 
types of ‘propositions’.
A.J. Ayer’s evaluation of Kant’s distinction between ana-
1 Alexander Alberro, “Reconsidering Conceptual Art, 1966-1977” in 
Alexander Alberro, Blake Stimson eds. Conceptual Art A Critical Anthology 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999) xvi.
V
LINEAGES OF CONCEPTUALISM
My work is hereditary to a history of multiple lineages of con-
ceptual art practice which came about in the sixties, an on-
ward. The encounters with conceptual work that actually were 
formative to the projects that I describe here are not easily ref-
erenced or summarized. Theorists like Michael Corris, Alex-
ander Alberro, and others have retrospectively articulated these 
lineages, and although I reference them, it is not because they 
were influential for me directly, but because they formalize a 
narrative that is similar to one I have constructed from a set of 
encounters with the work and some of the writings of the art-
ists they reference. Artists like Joseph Kosuth, Robert Smith-
son, Sol LeWitt, Ad Reinhard, and Robert Morris, a larger 
group of post-conceptual artists as disparate as Jenny Holzer 
and Gerhard Richter, Mark Ruwedel and Melvin Moti, as well 
as the work of my peers, all of whom bear a relationship to the 
paradigms established in the 1960’s and 70’s, have informed the 
projects here.
I’ll try to briefly explain some elements of conceptualism that 
have been significant to the projects on the geometry of per-
ception and cognition. 
Self-reflexivity “[of modernist painting and sculpture] that sys-
tematically problematizes and dismantles the integral elements 
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became the form of his work. Looking at his most fa-
mous, One and Three Chairs, one can understand how it 
came about as an instance of an analytic proposition. 
As a referendum on the relationship between object and 
representation within an artistic context, he shows that 
there are several ways in which the meaning of chair can 
be instantiated, physically, pictorially, and linguistically. 
He asserts the existence of modes of representation of 
objects and the primacy of the concept, which give rise 
to words, object, and images, all of which he considers 
subservient to meaning3.
The difference between artists who are concerned about 
the nature of art and those who are concerned with other 
matters in the world can be distinguished, according to 
Kosuth’s model, as analytic and synthetic. Analytic, by 
specifying a mode of analysis that can be done with ex-
clusively a priori knowledge, correlates to artwork that 
is concerned with with art, and is important exclusively 
in virtue of its idealized form, the idea or concept. Syn-
thetic, on the other hand, refers to knowledge which can 
only be made in virtue of empirical knowledge, which 
correlates to artwork which concerns matters in the sub-
jects outside of art itself and is dependent on its actual 
form. 
While Kosuth strictly limited his work to an analytic domain, 
most artists, while maintaining a form of reflexivity began to 
make “synthetic” endeavors, exploring other issues of specific 
3 Kosuth, Art After Philosophy and After
lytic and synthetic is useful to us here: “A proposition is 
analytic when its validity depends solely on the defini-
tions of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its 
validity is determined by the facts of experience.” The 
analogy I will attempt to make is one between the art 
condition and the condition of the analytic proposition. 
In that they don’t appear to be believable as anything else, 
nor about anything (other than art) the forms of art most 
clearly finally referable only to art have been forms clos-
est to analytical propositions.”2
Kosuth’s belief in the potential of an artwork as an ana-
lytic proposition, defined his definition of art and also 
2 Kosuth, Art After Philosophy and After, 24.
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about universal experience, rather than about a limited notion 
of artistic processes based on a morphological history of mod-
ernism and its predecessors, it is not tautological. Because it has 
a subject matter with infinite content, it is in very little danger 
of becoming a finite exercise, like orthodox artistic reflexivity.
Since there is so much about perception and cognition that is 
not understood, this would be impossible.
All components of the work being of equal importance.
This statement is a no a part off Kosuth’s ideology, but the 
ground that Sol LeWitt claims in opposition to him5. LeWitt’s 
position is centered around the significance of the viewer and 
his interpretation of the work. The materialization of the work 
and the concept of the work are equally important in this mod-
el: the idea is a “machine”6 that produces the work free of the 
arbitrary, subjective, and capricious character of the artist. The 
viewer is the significant subjectivity, instead of the artist. The 
work comes about according to the decisions of the public to 
make or view it, whereas in Kosuth’s work the public is essen-
tially irrelevant.7
My projects depend on the opposable strength of the idea and 
the materiality of the piece, particularly in the real experience 
of seeing them.8 Based on the equality of the components, I can 
5 Alberro, xx.
6 Sol LeWitt, “Paragraphs on Conceptual Art” Artforum June 1967.  
7 Alberro, xviii
8 This is a difficult point to make in a forum where only the ideas and 
documentation are present, but I hope my readers will extend me the ben-
efit of the doubt in this case.
knowledge beyond the domain of art. My practice, while go-
ing into areas of knowledge beyond art, has always done this 
with a healthy skepticism about the ability of the work to make 
these syntheses. I have kept a hand on Kosuth’s work, often 
keeping it a measure of the efficacy of venturing into other 
domains. 
The projects in this paper, reflecting on perception, as opposed 
to taking the phenomenological approach described in the fol-
lowing chapter, also have a structural similarity to tautological 
conceptual projects. Because perception and cognition are per-
vasive, like art is to art, investigation on this topic is also a re-
flexivity, or, more loosely, a referentiality, not precisely on the 
self as art, but on the self as subject. In the case of reflexivity on 
art the result was a tautology because the work of art was about 
the work, thus, it had no other content4. The reflexivity on 
perception is about the role of the person as sensor, a necessary 
component of experiencing the work. That the experience of 
the artwork itself requires perception and cognition, makes it 
reflexive in an analogous way. On the other hand, because it is 
4 Kosuth and others quickly discovered the infinite regress problem of 
art that was about art (with no content other than the experience of it 
itself ). The components of the artworks physical instantiation, such as the 
amount of ink on the printed page, the number of words, mode of repre-
sentation enacted in the image, such as text, image, object, or picture, and 
their placement in the physical, economic, and institutional environment, 
quickly became exhausted in their pure forms. Extended in their logical 
direction, all of these forms of content that were about the artwork itself 
quickly evolved into content that exceeded these boundaries. Institutional 
critique, modes of social intervention and activism, the relationship of the 
viewer to the work, became synthetic propositions, engaging content from 
a world external to the art and art production.
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The significance of context; physical, social, historic, linguistic.
“I turned to language (typescript, maps, audio tapes, etc.) in 
the 1960’s because I wanted to explore objects that can refer 
both to concepts and ideas beyond themselves and their stan-
dard functions, as well as to themselves; objects that both refer 
to abstract ideas that situate those very objects in new con-
ceptual and spaciotemporal matrixes, and also draw attention 
to the spatiotemporal matrices in which they’re embedded” 
10- Adrian Piper
This form of site specificity, awareness of location in space, 
time, culture, and institution is seen in Piper’s quote to be a 
function of language. Again the fundamental nature of this 
idea to the work that I show here is almost too simple to state; 
it underlies everything. The spacial time span of the texts se-
lected in Project Performance are one example of a referencing 
of the histories that we relevant to the visual culture of the 
brain. Another would be the content specificity of “table” as 
not a random noun, but the example that had been used by 
Bertrand Russell when he posed the problem in a literary form, 
which speaks to his person as a real man, sitting at a real table, 
using that object to talk about his ideas. Although my work is 
not site specific, in that it can be shown in different locales, the 
lineages of conceptualism that forged this awareness are a pres-
ence in the process of making the work due to the language 
10 Adrian Piper, “On Conceptual Art” in Alexander Alberro, Blake 
Stimson, eds. Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press) 424-425.
compose something like Projection Performance; Physical Descrip-
tions of the Brain which requires conceptual elements like men-
tal images, and a projected idea of a pathway of meaning stands 
alongside physical elements like projected light, the sound of 
voices, wooden posts and cotton screens. The interchangeable 
compositional aspects of the physical and non-physical are a 
necessary starting point for this piece. The Table Project also 
relies on the contrast between the idea of the table and physical 
table. Neither component would make sense without the other 
being of equal importance. 
Dematerialization of the art object and the alternative of the 
concept as central focus.
I first want to say that I am equally interested in the objecthood 
of the objects I use, as I am in the idea that an artwork can be 
composed out of ideas. Both of these interests are presupposed 
by the theorization of dematerialization. 
“When works of art, like words, are signs that convey ideas, 
they are not things in themselves but symbols of representatives 
of things”9 -Lucy Lippard and John Chandler
The connection of these ideas to the work I show here is almost 
to basic to explain; it underlies them; it allows them to exist. It 
is perhaps worth saying here anyway, since the significance has 
been a conscious one for me.
9 Lucy R. Lippard and John Chandler, “The Dematerialization of Art” 
in Alexander Alberro, Blake Stimson, eds. Conceptual Art: A Critical An-
thology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) 46-50, 49.
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presenting this prose in their journal and other artistic contexts. 
(footnote: this is distinct from Kosuth’s project, which sought 
to conflate analysis with meaning rather that language. Lan-
guage is yet another synthetic material according to his model. 
I do not frequently use isolated text as a medium, although it 
shows up in performances like Project Performance and A Small 
Replica of the Act of Conveying Meaning. More significant to my 
practice is the notion of the compositional qualities of prose as 
having a complex and detailed analogy to the compositional 
structure of performance or any other medium. The cascades 
of connotations in works like Langue/Parole Grid Project are 
characteristic of how I consider object and idea based phenom-
ena to have linguistic properties. Putting a table outside, or 
putting visual data into bronze, are similes of rhetorical jux-
taposition, not the visual kind. The mirror structure between 
the thought/speech and vision/drawing in Vision and Cognition, 
Inscape and Field are similarly modeled on the poetic model of 
internal reason that is derived from work that used language 
as a medium. John Baldessari was an artist I was aware of as 
I began to have an interest in this paradigm during my teens. 
The artwork as a proposition.
“Works of art are analytic propositions. That is, if viewed with-
in their context–as art– they provide no information what-so-
ever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in 
that it is a presentation of the artist’s intention, that is, he is 
saying that a particular work of art is art, which means, is a 
based nature of their conceptual composition. 
The establishment of serial and schematic modes of working.
This is by not a premise of any lineage of conceptualism, just 
a logical outcome of a lineage theorized by Alberro as begin-
ning with Laurence Wiener and Douglas Huebler. By denying 
the significance of the of the artist as producer, the elements 
of artistic production are joined to the condition of viewing. 
Anyone can interpret and anyone can construct. 
My work is not really serial or really schematic in the sense of 
the artist who embody these methodologies. The fovea proj-
ect is somewhat schematic, although it won’t be ultimately. 
The paradigmatic object grid and project performance both 
have serial elements. The influence of this tradition shows up 
as a certain freeness that I feel to use the materials at hand, to 
multiply objects, and to retain a “sketchiness” to the schemas 
and materials used in certain circumstances. The significance 
of certain materials and forms is a more prevalent side of my 
methodology, but it is tempered by this freedom. Also, if I 
ever have the opportunity, I might outsource the production 
of my work, so I espouse the philosophy behind these modes 
of production, although I have never had the chance to take 
advantage of them. 
Language as an artistic medium.
The idea of language as medium, pioneered by the Art & Lan-
guage Group, positioned texts about art-making as a new form, 
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definition of art. Thus, that it is art is true a priori.”11
  -Kosuth
The elements of idea of the proposition do not tie it to a tau-
tological model. If art is not only arts language, as every “syn-
thetic” artists contends, then whatever it is that is arts language 
can be substituted into the proposition. Other worlds, beyond 
the art world can be substituted as the context.
This is possibly the most visible of Kosuth’s contributions to the 
projects that I present here. The idea of the artwork as a propo-
sition is a kind of super set of the artwork as experiment, the 
proposition being a more basic form. The proposition can be 
anything, but it always has representational content. It cannot 
be explained on a purely aesthetic basis because of this content. 
When I began to think of my work as propositions (based on 
reading Wittgenstein – I only realized that I was the last artist 
across the finish line on this idea later on) it gave me a freedom 
to change the propositional attitude of the objects I was mak-
ing in a way that I hadn’t quite achieved  when I though of the 
art that I was making as objects. Sol LeWitt’s philosophy of 
the relationship of the work to the viewer or user, is ultimately 
much more appropriate than Kosuth’s, since the upshot of the 
proposition is that it can be taken into the hands of others. It 
is a proposal to people whose subjectivity is the catalyst of the 
proposition. All of the projects here are propositions because of 
the conceptual material they are composed of. They are then 
11 Joseph Kosuth, “Art After Philosophy” in Alexander Alberro, Blake 
Stimson, eds. Conceptual Art: A Critical Anthology (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press) 158-177, 165.
experiments in virtue of the instantiation of these propositions 
in physical form in public and private spaces.
EXPERIMENTS AND POEMS, 
FRAGMENTS AND NETWORKS
The paradigm of the poem, as well as the experiment, that I 
introduced concurrently at the beginning of the thesis, also has 
a structural basis in the work of artists who posited language as 
an art form.  If the experiment is a material instantiation of a 
proposition, the poem is a network made of fragments of con-
tent drawn from other sources. Found and reconfigured into a 
tension-based system of relations, they are multi layered, non-
rational, linguistic, material, and aesthetic.
Kosuth, by using Kant and Ayer’s definition of geometry, was 
able to pose a solution to the problem of the reconciliation of 
“morphological” art with the new forms being made by him-
self and his peers, Judd, Morris, LeWitt, A & L, etc. This intense 
drive to use the work, not as an aesthetic meditation but as an 
analytic proposition, drawing connections between words and 
objects, needed to have a relationship with the work of his pre-
decessors, it required justification through a logical differentia-
tion that had to be made on the terms of the movement – as 
a logical argument, made using the tools put forth by analytic 
philosophers (here exemplified by A.J. Ayer)1:
1 Referenced here by Kosuth in Art After Philosophy and After
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“We see not that the axioms of a geometry are simply defini-
tions, and that the theorems of a geometry are simply the logical 
consequences these definitions. A geometry is not in itself about 
physical space; in itself it cannot be said to be ’about’ anything. 
But we can use a geometry to reason about physical space. That 
is to say, once we have given the axioms a physical interpreta-
tion, we can proceed to apply the theorems to the objects which 
satisfy the axioms. Whether a geometry can be applied to the 
actual physical world or not, is an empirical question which 
falls outside of the scope of geometry itself. There is no sense, 
therefore, in asking which of the various geometries know to 
us are false and which are true. In so far as they are all free from 
contradiction, they are all true. The proposition which states that 
a certain application of a geometry is possible is not itself a 
proposition of that geometry. All that the geometry itself tells us 
is that if anything can be brought under the definitions, it will 
also satisfy the theorems. It is therefore a purely logical system, 
and its propositions are purely analytic propositions. 
-A.J. Ayer
Here then I propose rests the viability of art. In an age when 
traditional philosophy is unreal because of its assumptions, art’s 
ability to exist will depend not only on its not performing a 
service–as entertainment, visual (or other) experience, or deco-
ration–which is something easily replaced by kitsch culture and 
technology, but rather it will remain viable by not assuming a 
philosophical stance; for in art’s unique character is the capac-
ity to remain aloof from philosophical judgements. It is in this 
context that art shared similarities with logic, mathematics and, 
as well, science. But whereas the other endeavors are useful, art 
is not. Art indeed exists for its own sake.”2
In the transition that Kosuth creates between the two para-
graphs, one can see that he relies on an implicit fragmentation 
of Ayer’s meaning in order to make his own point. Ayer says, es-
sentially, that geometries are abstract systems. Kosuth takes this 
articulation of the definition of abstract system, a fragment of 
Ayer’s thought, and breaks it away from the numerical systems 
that Ayer is referring to. In place of this numerical system he 
substitutes another fragment, an abstract of artistic practice, cre-
ating a hybrid meaning between Ayer and himself, in order to 
say that art doesn’t make philosophical judgements. He draws a 
highly abstracted analogy between the 1)geometries and the 2)
physical world and 1a)artistic practice and 2a)functionality/phil-
osophical judgements. These philosophical judgements that he 
speaks about, represent, for me, the purposes that people use to 
go about everyday life, their philosophies, the dictates of func-
tion, which is why the two can be equated. Functional objects, 
I believe he asserts, must stand apart from artistic objects, like 
geometries stand apart from the physical world. 
The non-rational is the discontinuity between questions and 
answers. Perhaps the question of the viability of art, or ‘What 
artists do?’3 was one beginning of the assertion of the non-ra-
2 Kosuth, Art after Philosophy and After, 24.
3 Michael Corris, “What Do Artists Know: Contemporary Responses 
to the Deskilling of Art” ACT lecture series, February 17th 2012, http://
techtv.mit.edu/videos/17724-act-lecture-michael-corris-what-do-art-
88
tional answer for Kosuth. The fragmenting of texts by the Art 
& Language Group4 in the project Blurting in Art & Language, 
and I would also contend the fragmenting of knowledge in the 
same way the Kosuth fragments and re purposes Ayer’s work, 
drawn from knowledge of a set of fields and authors including 
Wittgenstein and Ayer, philosophy and philosophy of science, 
systems theory, sociology, linguistics, politics, et al, is an example 
of a method used to create a meaningful discontinuity. Con-
taining their own thoughts, recorded as “blurts” Blurting in Art 
&Language is an index project that displays this methodology of 
fragmentation and re-synthesis through a network of navigable 
pathways built on strong and weak contextual relations: 
“It was based on a notion of annotating: a set of short state-
ments or remarks were written and a series of commentaries or 
annotations derived from these. This procedure continued and 
the resulting bulk of collected ‘annotations’ exhibited a vari-
ety of branchings, contradictory sequences, learning chains and 
the whole project producing a shared topography...Much of this 
material will be incomprehensible at a glance. In order to get 
anything out of the material you would have to activate some of 
the potential pathways. Embeddedness becomes crucial.”5
I bring this up to acknowledge their relationship to my practice 
as predecessors and the similar content of fragmentation – phi-
ists-know.
4 Ian Burn, Michael Corris, Preston Heller, Andrew Menard, Mel Rams-
den, Terry Smith under the title Art & Language.
5 Found in the Introduction to the online version of Blurting in Art & 
Language: http://container.zkm.de/blurting/introduction.html
losophy of language and philosophy of mind. The knowledge, by 
definition, has refined form and selected content. Through this 
fracturing, those qualities are retained. The methodology, how-
ever, of its original authors is abandoned. The rational state of its 
creation is replaced by the non-rational, the personal method-
ology of an individual or a group of artists. This methodology 
is consistently variable, between groups of artists, individuals, 
and sometimes periods within an individuals artistic practice, 
which is the crucial distinction between it and its disciplinary 
origin. Often, although dependent on the artistic methodology, 
the linear meaning of the original content, through the process 
of fragmentation is formulated into a network of meaning. This 
network is then instantiated into pathways through the encoun-
ter of a viewer. Many possible paths exist within the network, 
and depending on the individual circumstance of the participant 
or user or viewer, one of these courses in chosen, and meaning 
is produced through the course of this selection in accordance, 
not only with the interests and insights of the artist, who set up 
certain potentials, but the participant who navigated the net-
work. This is the form of navigation that I hope is apparent in 
the projects presented here.
experiential one. Which is what I mean by phenomenological: 
it’s made in real time.”13 Work of this type has an identifi-
13 Olafur Eliasson and Robert Irwin Take your time: A Conversation. 
(San Francisco Museum of Modern Art and Thames & Hudson) 2007.
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AUTHORING THE PERCEPT:
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
APPROACH
The majority of engagement in the visual arts with the con-
cepts of perception and cognition takes a phenomenological 
stance. Olafur Eliasson’s work is a prominent example that 
uses this methodology. The Weather Project, one of Eliasson’s 
most famous, functions in this way: as a provocation of per-
ceptual experience, possible conceived as ‘pure’ rather than an 
admixture of cognition and perception, although Eliasson has 
stated that the prior is not his intent. The installation in the 
Tate Modern (seen in the image) created the illusion of a giant 
glowing sun above the gallery using monochromatic lights and 
vapor. Visitors would often lay with their backs on the floor, 
staring, mesmerizing by the object saturating their vision. The 
phenomenology of this saturating meditation of sight, char-
acterize the exhibition.12 In an interview between Robert Ir-
win and Eliasson, Irwin describes both his and Eliasson’s work: 
“The big move is when we eliminate abstract references to art 
history, and the person walking through the work doesn’t have 
to know anything about you or art. That puts it on the most 
immediate social level, because the observer’s referencing the 
same cues you are. It’s no longer an abstract referencing, it’s an 
12 Richard Dorment, “A Terrifying Beauty” The Telegraph, Nov. 12, 
2003. (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/3606332/A-terrifying-
beauty.html)
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“What is special in the case of conditional experience is, I 
think, what I sometimes call the introspective quality of see-
ing: you see whatever you’re looking at, but you also see the 
way you’re seeing. You can find pleasure or fear in what you’re 
experiencing, but your experience of the thing is integrated as 
a part of the thing itself.”14
The opposite of what Eliasson is saying here might also be true 
though: when you are absorbed in an experience like staring 
at a glowing orb, you stop thinking about what you’re think-
ing and think of nothing, or let your mind wander. It is pos-
sible that the indirect process of “seeing seeing” that Eliasson 
and Irwin invoke may occur, but this inverse possibility seems 
equally likely. Eliasson believes that the effect of authoring 
an experience can be the disintegration of accepted modes of 
though. I find this contention plausible within the moment of 
spectacular experience, but unlikely to ultimately to make any 
impact after the moment of experience. I find it hard to imag-
ine that the moment of spectacular experience will alter a per-
son’s conceptions of phenomenology, or change the framework 
that they use to think about perception. It is more likely that to 
invoke and examine extant modes of thought in a direct way 
would alter ingrained stereotypes about sensation. 
The historical tendency to isolate perception from language, 
though it may be rationally motivated, in order to distinguish 
perception as concept apart from cognition, is of very limited 
use. For creatures who have language, language is a component 
of perception. Representations of perception who begin from 
14 Ibid
able similarity: the artist is the direct author of the percept. 
Often this form seeks to isolate perceptual experience from 
language and cognition, the consequent phenomena of percep-
tion. I interpret this need to isolate perception from language 
and cognition as an act of definition, propelled by the need to 
distinguish perception as a pre-linguistic phenomenon in order 
to rescue it from a sort of invisibility. It is true that the moment 
to moment function of perception is pre-conscious, which ren-
ders it invisible to routine conscious experience. However, it 
is a simplification of the notion of perception to isolate it from 
the processes of language and cognition that are necessarily 
integral to cognitive processes. When Irwin talks about elimi-
nating references, he is speaking about erasing cognition from 
the perceptual process. This is the same as ‘pure phenomenol-
ogy.’
 I have no objection to the work of artists who seek to author 
a perception, however, it is my intuition that within the body 
of work concerned or even non-explicitly related to percep-
tion, this first hand stance is represented much more strongly 
than work which serves to reflect upon the phenomenon of 
perception through a form of analysis. A form of direct experi-
ence may be viscerally powerful, but is not able to capture or 
comment upon the ways that linguistic and conceptual tropes 
impact understandings of perception. Because this has become 
an important aim in my projects, I have no interest in isolating 
phenomenology by eliminating cognition from the perceptual 
pathway. 
Eliasson: 
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the history of granting an “interiority modeled on the dualist’s 
idea of consciousness” to paintings and other vaunted media. 
I find Morris’s stance towards behaviorist ideology to be am-
biguous. While it can certainly be seen as a mockery of the 
behaviorist ideology, it is not clear to me that he found the 
idea of a wooden box as a model of the brain to be absurd. It 
could simply be a minimalist configuration of the brain, made 
out of basic and available materials. In the 1960’s Behaviorism 
was seen as a breakthrough towards the objective study of the 
brain. The leader of Behaviorist though, B.F. Skinner, posi-
tioned the study of animal (including human) behavior as an 
alternative to the study of subjective thoughts. It was imagined 
that this would be able to do away with all of the reified men-
tal structures posited by psychology, such as the subconscious, 
preconscious, ego, id, etc. Of course, the study of human be-
havior was not adequate to explain most of the intense com-
plexity of human sociality, motivation, and behavior, without 
the subjective labels that we ascribe to human thought such as 
love and fear, which come from subjective observations. The 
proponents of the ideology quickly became disillusioned. It is 
interesting to consider whether or not Morris was a believer 
in this promise of objective knowledge of the human mind, 
since the coherence of his work could be judged in different 
ways on the basis of this distinction. Because Morris’s had no 
interest here in authoring a percept for the audience, a dialectic 
developed between Morris’s work and the issue of objectivity 
and behavior that was the contemporaneous scientific discus-
sion. Because of this exchange, the work itself can be viewed as 
offering a reflection of the crucial issues at hand within Behav-
iorist thought during the 1960’s.
this premise have a much stronger basis upon which to un-
derstand the particulars when experimenting with perceptual 
content.
Box With A Sound of Its Own Making, by Robert Morris is an-
otable precedent of a metaphorical representation of the mind/
body problem. A wooden box, containing equipment that plays 
back the noises of sawing, hammering, etc. that were gener-
ated within its own construction, is a both a literal metaphor of 
the mind and a opinionated comment on the transparency of 
mind from a pure empirical perspective. Morris, who is cred-
ited with theorizing minimalism in the 1960’s, engaged with 
the mind/body problem via his interest in the relationship of 
the body to objects, particularly simplified objects, whose di-
rect geometry, such as rectangles and polygons, he believed to 
be more visually complex than non-geometric objects. Morris 
believed that the geometric forms were distorted by visual per-
ception in a way that could be recognized, thus there was an 
inherent complexity in the appearance of the basic geometry of 
these forms that was not apparent in organic, superficially more 
complex forms. Since that time there have been studies done 
specifically to uncover the geometry of the visual field. 
Rosalind Krauss considers the sound in Box With A Sound of 
Its Own Making to be a analog of memory, as well as an es-
pousal of behaviorist thought, the idea being that the box is 
a sum of its own objectively observable experiences (as “per-
ceived” by the tape recorder). Thus the box mocks the idea of 
the private, subjective experience, as well as the idea of imput-
ing conscious experience to inanimate objects, a reflection on 
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VISION AND COGNITION, INSCAPE AND FIELD
Performance Note:
[From behind, two projectors light a 4’ by 8’ screen, a sheet of white cotton mounted to a wooden frame in the center of the room. The two frames, side by 
side, show photographs of two offices, belonging to two of the performers, A and B. The rest of the room is dark. The audience enters the performance after 
it has begun. A and B are having a conversation about the purpose of the work. A and B ask each other questions. They have been informed to speak their 
thoughts in the most direct possible form, without changing the thought to conform to grammar, or even to English. 
A few feet in front of the projector there are two podiums, 2’ x 2’ with sloping surfaces. Performers C and D stand each behind a stand. The surface of the 
stand is a white sheet of paper. C and D draw the image they are standing in front of onto the paper using compressed charcoal and an eraser. They have 
been instructed to look at 3 inch dots that have been drawn with the charcoal onto the screen in the center of both images. They can look and the dot as well 
as the paper, but they cannot look anywhere else in the image. They must depict the entire image onto the piece of paper. 
This activities of drawing and speaking happen simultaneously for approximately 10 minutes. The performance ends and room lights are turned. ]
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Vision and Cognition, Inscape and Field begins to get at the heart 
of the problem of the discrepancy between thoughts and ex-
pressions. The language tools that we have to relay the differ-
ences between the thought and the expression are extremely 
limited. For example the though that I am having right now, 
the idea behind the expression that I am currently typing, is 
not fully expressed by the words that I am putting onto the 
page. They are the best that I have, but they are only a flattened 
and distorted translation of the inscape, not its reality. There is 
nothing more that I can say to convey the differences, because 
that itself would have to be a linguistic expression. But the 
expression that was possible in the actions and objects of the 
performance are able to approach the inscape in a less mediated 
form. 
Other holes in our schemas that fit into this claim are the sepa-
ration between perception and cognition that is ever present in 
the text of this thesis (resorting to the form perception/cogni-
tion is my feeble attempt to avoid the miscommunication that 
they are separate entities; the notion that a definition is a thing 
and not a boundary, that it is absolute in this way; and simpli-
fied notions of vision that fail to account for attention, mem-
ory, temporality, color relativity, etc.) I hope these examples 
show the meaning behind the claim that the language that we 
use to communicate about perception might be faulty. 
CONCLUSION 
The mode of articulation of these projects is certainly not a fac-
tual or scientific one, however, trying to reconstruct and sim-
By juxtaposing two similar attempts to defy the natural forms 
of perception and cognition, part of this piece is conveying 
the integral nature of both vision and speech to a single pro-
cess. However by representing tropes of perception and expres-
sion, sight, drawing, and speech, I also intended to question 
the function of these terms within the artificial scenario. Be-
cause the piece necessarily conveys the failure of these modes 
in isolation, the critique underlies the use of the terminology. 
The terminology is of course not used directly, but rather, the 
words of speech, drawing, hearing, seeing are all implicated 
by the objects and actions that are placed into the arena of the 
performance. They are inevitably used by the audience, myself, 
and instantiate in the context of the work. 
The idea of mapping the structure of the retina of the Fovea 
Camera is reused in this project. Instead of being a straightfor-
ward machine, or survey, the idea is recast into unassisted hu-
man effort by performers drawing their visual fields. It asks the 
performers to project a difficult task onto an everyday percep-
tual and cognitive act. The composition of the visual field and 
the inscape of the cognition are imaginary forms that both the 
performer and the audience can project onto the perceptual/
cognitive pathway. The project uses this construction as part 
of a larger conceptual structure that proposes the translation 
from visual stimulus to percept as a mirror of the translation of 
thought into speech. This is an example of the use of factual 
information about perception and cognition being reconfig-
ured in a poetic structure that reveals something about both 
components.  
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plify systems of language and perception/cognition, the proj-
ects share a basic motivation with brain sciences and linguistics, 
which try to articulate the same systems in a different way. I am 
deeply fascinated by and indebted to the knowledge that has 
been generated by these disciplines. Structures like the fovea, 
langue and parole, or mental images, are the result of scientific 
and analytic investigation; they allow me to make thought ex-
periments about the experience that is involved in the systems 
they compose. The easy problem of consciousness, which is not 
at all easy for the people who work on it, is the type of problem 
that my projects actually address. It is only easy in comparison 
to the hard problem, the question of why there is conscious 
experience. This basic dilemma, that has been worked on for 
hundreds of years without a substantial dent, is a basic moti-
vation for my interest. I, like the philosophers who actually 
work on this problem, such as Chalmers and Nagel, have no 
easy way of modeling an answer to the problem. What form 
an answer would take is even controversial–Would it be a new 
discipline of physics? Would it be a discovery that the problem 
that we believe to exist actually isn’t a problem at all? 
Our conceptions of the world are limited, but our ability to 
question the error in these pictures allows us to endlessly re-
formulate those conceptions according to new knowledge, ac-
quired through investigation. Tangible experiments, whether 
they are rigorous science or visual poems, contribute to our 
knowledge of perception and cognition. Comparing these 
radically different methodologies and occasionally testing the 
boundaries of where they can contribute to one another helps 
expand both experiential and factual knowledge.  
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